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Eucudnve Sunnnmary 
At  the  Cardiff European  Council  in  June  1998,  Europe's  leaders  underlined  the 
important  contribution  of structural  and  economic  reform  in  the  fight  against 
unemployment.  In this report,  the  European  Commission presents a  broad-ranging 
analysis of recent progress in  this area  and  priorities  for  the  future.  This  so-called 
"Cardiff II"  report follows  an  earlier document on the  functioning  of product and 
capital  markets  published  on  20  January  1999  ("Cardiff I")  and  also  draws  on 
Member States progress reports and national action plans on employment. The aim is 
to contribute to the preparation of  the broad economic policy guidelines which will be 
agreed  at  the  European  Council  in June  and  to  feed  into  discussions  on the  new 
Employment Pact proposed by the German Presidency. 
The  central  message  of the  report  is  that  structural  reform  is  essential  to  foster 
employment and growth in Europe.  Many reforms have already been undertaken in 
all  Member  States  but  their  implementation.  across  fields  and  countries  varies 
considerably. This diversity reflects the different economic and political situations in 
Member State, but it also points to the need for intensified cooperation of economic 
policies at European level. 
The other main message is  the importance of taking due account of the  interaction 
between  the  various  aspects  of structural  reform  and  macroeconomic  policies.  In 
particular, Member States should make every effort to achieve : 
•  Coherence  between  reforms  of different  markets.  Goods  markets  are 
generally well integrated, but lack of  capital market integration hinders the 
creation of ·new  enterprises  and jobs due  to  constraints on risk  capital, 
especially  for  SMEs.  Further  improvement  in  the  integration  of goods 
markets  also  needs  to  be  accompanied  by  better  functioning  labour 
markets  providing  adequate  skills  and  incentives  to  take  up  new job 
opportunities. 
•  Coherence  between  reforms  of product  markets.  Integration  of goods 
markets  needs  to  go  hand-in-hand  with  further  liberalisation of service 
sectors. Further integration of product markets should not be accompanied 
by increases in state aids which reduce competition in such markets. 
•  Coherence  between  reform  ·of  labour  markets  and  public  finances. 
· Increased efforts to prevent long-term unemployment through early use of . 
active labour market policies must be  accompanied by reductions in the 
incentives to remain in benefit schemes. Reforms should also make sure 
that the unemployed are not simply transferred from  assistance to  other 
benefits schemes. 
By  improving  the  functioning  of  markets,  structural  reforms  permit  a  more 
accommodating  macroeconomic  policy  thanks  to  reduced  inflationary  pressures. 
Improved and sustainable  public  finances  also  improve  the  capacity of budgetary 
policy  to  stabilise  economic  activity  across  the  business  cycle.  At the  same time, 
1~ however,  tax reform  (especially much-needed reductions in  the taxation of labour) 
must be mindful of  further necessary budget consolidation. 
Economic and structural reform contributes to job creation. 
Structural  reform  increases  the  EU's  job-creating  potential  and  is  therefore 
fundamental to the task of reducing the  high levels of structural unemployment. · It 
will  achieve  this  by  enhancing 'the  EU's competitiveness and  sustainable  long-run 
economic  growth  rate,  as  well  as  its  ability  to  deal  with  globalisation  and 
technological change.  · 
Structural  reform,  in  conjunction  with  a  sound  macro-economic  policy,  1s  also 
essential  to  the  success  of Economic  and  Monetary  Union;  by  improving  the 
operation of markets, macroeconomic policy  will  not  be  leH  to  bear the  burden  of 
market  adjustment  in  the  face  of shocks  alone.  Indeed,  by  removing  supply-side 
bottienecks,  structural . reform  wiil  allow  the  EU  to  run  a  more  accommodating 
macroeconomic policy. 
Awareness  of  these  virtues  has  led  to  widespread  ill)plementation  of reforms 
throughout  the  EU.  Thanks  to  the  Single  Market  Programme,  today's  European 
product markets work much better than they did in the  1970s. ·Establishing the euro 
will  improve  the  operation of capital  and  financial  markets.  Labour markets  and 
welfare  systems  are  being  reformed.  Nonetheless,  individual  Member  States' 
progress in developing these reforms is very variable.  As a result, employment and 
innovation in some sectors, especially services, is disappointing. 
This  Report  details  many  structural  reforms  already  undert~en.  It  finds  that 
implementation of  reforms remains uneven across fields and across Member States. In 
general, progress is relatively satisfactory in goods and capital markets, but less so for 
services and labour markets. In addition, countries which have rriade most progress in 
product  markets  also  seem  to  have  advanced  most  in  capital  and  labour  markets. 
Nonetheless,  labour  productivity,  employment  and  GDP  per  capita  arc  all · 
significantly higher in the  US  than in the  EU,  indicating that structural ,deficiencies 
continue to be important across the Union. 
The Single Market has improved the functioning of product markets, although 
problems remain in public procurement, standa:rds, and state aids. 
Thanks to the Single Market Programme, EU product markets are relatively integrated 
and function quite well. Nevertheless, remaining price differences between Member 
States, and between the EU and the US, suggest that room remains for improvement, 
especially in service sectors and public procurement markets.  Soine  goods  sectors 
also  seem relatively  segmented - particularly pharmaceuticals,  chemicals, food  and 
motor vehicles.  Factors  a_ccounting  for  the  persistence  of price  dispersion  include 
taxation, regulatory barriers and inefficiencies in distribution and network industries. 
Introducing  the  euro  will  sharpen  price  transparency  and  competition,  which  will 
squeeze -price dispersion in  EU markets. This process will  be  further strenghened by 
progress  with  the  Single  Market  Programme  (SMP)  and  strict  application  of 
competition policy rules by the EU and at the level of Member States.  As highlighted 
by the Commission's recent report ori the operation of EU goods, services and capital 
2 markets ("Cardiff I" - see below), some Member States have relatively poor record in 
transposition of single  market  measures  and  this  must  be  rectified;  beyond  that, 
market developments must be monitored in order to identify problem areas and ensure 
effective enforcement of Single Market rules. Already, two problem areas stand out: 
the  opening-up  of  public  procurement,  and  differing  Member  State  technical 
standards.  Concerning competition policy, increased competitive pressure following 
introduction of the euro and deepening of the Single Market may stimulate demands 
for State aids  ..  These must be resisted by stricter control of State aids, otherwise the 
positive effects of  market liberalisation may be offset by market distortions created by 
government  support  for  selected  sectors.  The  Commission  will  maintain  a  strict 
application  of Community  state  aid  rules  but  the  Member  States  should  make  a 
concerted effort to reduce the level of  aids, especially ad hoc and sectoral aids. 
Regulatory reforms to lower prices for consumers and burdens for business 
The  EU'  s  product  and  capital  markets  operate  within  regulatory  frameworks. 
Regulatory reform to  optimise these frameworks is another cornerstone of efforts to 
improve the functioning of  product and capital markets. Regulatory reform consists of 
imp~oving the  quality  of regulations,  and  may  or  may  not  involve  deregulation. 
Between EU countries and between sectors, the progress of regulatory  reform varies 
widely.  Done  properly,  however,  experiences  in  Member  States  and  other  OECD 
countries show that it can significantly improve the functioning of targeted sectors. 
Member State records vary considerably, but broadly speaking, liberalisation is most 
advanced  in  telecommunications  (causing  prices  to  fall),  road  haulage  and  non-
reserved postal services. Some progress has also been achieved in energy sectors, the 
regulation of retail distribution (land use and opening hours) and regulations relating 
to  business  start-ups  (which mainly  affect  SMEs).  Liberalisation  in railways  and 
water, on the other hand, is virtually non-existent.  One lesson_ from the experience of 
liberalisation is that the public will accept it more if its positive impact on price and 
quality  is  quickly  experienced  by  consumers  and  industrial  users.  Establishing 
effective, independent regulatory bodies is essential for this to happen. 
The SMP and the introduction of the euro will accelerate the emergence of an 
integrated  European  financial  market.  However,  differences  in  national 
regulations  and  tax  regimes  prevent  deeper  capital  markets  and  constrain 
expansion of risk capital for SMEs and R&D 
Integrating  capital  markets  properly  depends  on  free  and  substantive  cross-border 
provision of financial  services and cross-border movement of capital. The Cardiff I 
Report  finds  that  there  has  been  good  progress  in  both  areas  but,  nevertheless, 
differences  in· national  regulatory  environments  and  fiscal  regimes  continue  to 
fragment  EU  capital  markets.  By· .offering  the  prospect  of a  large,  single  capital 
market, introduction of the euro creates a strong incentive to remove these remaining 
barriers. To which end the Commission and the Member States have created a High 
Level Group on Financial Services which will submit a report to the June 1999 Ecofin 
Council identifying the political priorities for developing more liquid and efficient EU 
capital markets.  Deeper and better functioning risk capital markets would facilitate 
SME expansion an~ promote R&D and innovation. 
3 Reforms of labour markets 2..Jre  II.R!mder way. But inadlequmte in.vestme~mt m  human 
capital and incentnves to cre~te and! take up jobs still hamper job creatnon 
Low employment rates  and .high  and  persistent  levels  of structural  unemployment 
suggest that,  in· addition to  the  remaining problems in  product and  capital  markets 
highlighted  above,  labour  markets  function  relatively  poorly  in  the  EU.  However, 
closer examination suggest that the  problem  differs  a great deal  between  Member 
States,  between  regions  within  Member  States,  and  between  categories  of labour. 
These differences also suggest a number of lessons: (1) differences between Member 
States  indicate  that  countries  which  have  undertaken  comprehensive  structural 
reforms, rather than scattered measures, have been able to  improve their employment 
performance; (2) differences in regional unemployment in several countries highlight 
the need to account for regional productivity differences in collective bargaining; and 
(3)  the  particularly  high  inCidence  of unemployment  among  certain  categories  of 
labour (low.:skilled,  females,  youngsters)  reflects  the  high  cost  of specific  labour 
categories  (in  particular  unskilled  workers),  the  inadequacy  ·of skills,  recruitment 
patterns and de facto discrimination. 
To tackle these problems, the Employment Guidelines foresee  structural reforms  in 
four  areas:  employability,  entrepreneurship,  adaptab,ility  and  equal  opportunities. 
Efforts by Member States to implement the whole of set of Guidelines are monitored 
and analysed 'in the annual Joint Employment Report. The Vienna European Council 
called  on  Member  States  to  define  policies  and  specify  deadlines  and  quantified 
targets  in  their  National  Action  Plaris  for,  employment.  The  present  Report 
concentrates on reforms of  tax/benefit systems and regulation. 
Member States have not just started the process of structur(ll labour market reforms. 
Most  are  making  great  efforts  to  switch  employment  policies  towards  a  more 
preventive approach involving early use of active labour market policies as  reque~ted 
by the Employment Guidelines. Many Member States have also introduced targeted 
measures designed to increase the demand for unskilled labour, often in the context of 
reforms of tax and  benefit systems aimed at reducing labour costs.  Several tax and 
benefit reforms designed to provide incentives for unemployed or inactive persons to 
seek and take up work or training opportunities have also been implemented.  What 
seems  to  be  lacking,  however,  is  coherence  between the  different  measures.  This 
confirms the need, as  foreseen  in the  1999 Employment Guidelines,  to.  review and 
adapt the tax and benefit systems to  ensure that they actively support employability 
and job creation.  These reforms,  should  be  viewed,  as  recommended  in  the  Broad 
Economic Policy Guidelines, in relation to labour market regulations. 
An intense budgetary consolidation effort has taken place with the Maastricht 
objectives.  However,  pressure  on  welfare  spending,  high  tax  levels  and 
inadequate  tax  co-ordination  jeopardise  the  sustai.nability  of  government 
finances and the efficiency of the Single Market 
Effort is still required to ensure the sustainability of  on-going budgetary consolidation 
and stability of the euro. Tax systems in the E{J  face three challenges. First, taxation 
levels tend to be  high compared with the  US  or Japan, although there are important 
differences  across  Member  States.  High  tax  burdens  are  associated  with  a  high 
provision  of public  services  and  generous  redistribution  mechanisms,  which  are 
generally desirable, but they also tend to  reduce economic incentive and efficiency .. 
4 Second, the structure of EU tax systems tends to impose a particularly heavy burden 
on labour, but again there are significant differences between Member States. Third, 
the  efficiency  of tax  systems  requires  a  higher  degree  of co-ordination  between 
national tax systems to better ensure the smooth functioning of the Single Market. In 
addition, it reinforces the  burden of taxation on labour, since capital  is  more easily 
able to move towards EU countries with low tax rates. 
As a result of the budgetary consolidation associated with the Maastricht objectives, 
the tax burden has stopped increasing in nearly all Member States and currently stands 
well below historical peak levels in half of the cases. At the same time, a number of 
Member  States  have  implemented important  ~ax reforms  designed  to  simplify  the 
system, broaden the tax base and  reduce the  taxation on labour.  Scope for  further 
reform, in particular in favour of labour, remains ample. But reform is also politically 
intricate since it involves either lowering both taxation and government expenditure 
so as to maintain budgetary discipline and price stability, or shifting some of the tax 
burden to  other tax  bases.  Finally,  as  noted  by  the  Cardiff I  Report,  the  higher 
economic  integration  associated  with  EMU  implies  greater  interaction  between 
national tax systems. In this context, while recognising that tax competition between 
countries can be healthy, Member States should strive to co-ordinate their tax systems 
so  as to  eliminate harmful competition which could endanger the functioning of the 
internal market and the provision of  desirable public services. They should also adopt 
legislation designed to achieve an origin-based VAT system, to remove all remaining 
obstacles to  cross-border integration of product markets and  to  allow a  real  single 
market for financial services. 
Reforms  of public  finances _concern  not  only  public -revenues,  but  also  public 
expenditures. Here the main challenge relates to the welfare state, which bears heavy 
pressures as a result of fundamental demographic changes. Most Member States have 
already  undertaken  reforms  to  improve  the  incentive  structure  of their. pension 
systems  and  their  health  care  systems,  but  further  action  is  required  in  order  to 
manage future demographic pressures.  Whilst public expenditure needs to be better 
controlled in most countries, it is paramount to preserve public investment, both in 
human capital and infrastructure. 
5 A  INTRODUCTION 
Structural reforms have an  important role to play in fostering economic growth and 
employment,  since  they  help  ensure  sustainable  long-run  growtl~,  reinforce 
competitiveness and increase the job-content of growth. This growing awareness has 
led to the implementation ofreforms throughout the EU. Indeed, the 1970s' image of 
Europe  hampered  by  widespread  structural  rigidities  does  no  longer correspond  to 
reality.  Low  employment  rates  and  persistent  high  unemployment,  together  with 
higher price levels in the EU than in the US, point, however, to the need for continued 
reform efforts. So does the fact that reform efforts have been uneven across fields and 
Member States. 
Globalisation and technological developments bring structural changes; which can be 
more  or less  painful  depending  on  the  economies  capacity  to  create  new business 
· opportunities and on people's ability and readiness to shift jobs. Adequate regulations·. 
and in~titutions, including a weB-functioning welfare state,  are required to smooth the 
adjustment.  Structural  reforms  also  contribute  to  a  balanced  policy  mix  between 
macroeconomic  and  microeconomic  policies  in  EMU,  by  reducing  the  burden  on 
macroeconomic policies in the event of  shocks and by enhancing their effectiveness in 
sustaining growth and s~abilising the cycle. 
To reap the full benefits of  structural reforms a comprehensive and coherent approach, 
that addresses the interests of consumers and producers, is necessary to take account · 
of  the interlinkage between the different markets and areas. Thus reforms in the goods 
and capital markets have to· be  accompanied by  more reform efforts in service and 
labour  markets  to  produce  welfare  and  jobs.  Within  the  different  markets  reform 
efforts have to be coherent. State aids should not replace technical .barriers ih goods 
markets. Neither should early retirement benefits or other passive measures replace 
unemployment benefits for the unemployed. 
Co-ordination at the EU  and EMU level  will enhance the success of reform efforts. 
The Cardiff European Council, asked for  closer monitoring on and co-ordination of 
economic  reform.  This  report  identifies  structural  problems  and  reviews  different 
policy solutions, taking into account existing policy recommendations in the structural 
areas.  It brings  together  and  builds  on  a  number of EU  initiatives  in  the  area of 
structural reforms. Namely: the process of  monitoring of the functioning of  the Single 
Market;  the  EU  employment  strategy  and  the  surveillance  of product and  capital 
market reforms, also established in Cardiff (Cardiff I and national reports). It deals 
with areas where there are clear Community competencies, areas where competencies 
are shared between the union and the Member States and,  finally,  areas_ where the 
responsibility lies at the national level. The report should form a· basis for Ministers' 
discussion of the  structural reforms  deemed  appropriate/necessary to  foster  growth 
an~  employment and to ensure a smooth functioning of  the EMU. 
-- 6  ._  7-B  MAIN AREAS OF STRUCTURAL POLICIES  '  ..  ;· 
1. IMPROVING THE FUNCTIONING OF PRODUCT (GOODS AND SERVICES) MJ\RKETS 
1.1  Evidence on the fun~_~ioning of product markets 
... 
Well-functioning markets are an essential ingredient of  a dynamic economy. Progress made 
towards  market  integration  and  the  degree  of market  efficiency'  i.e.  whether  markets 
respond rapidly and adequately to price impulses, are assessed below by tracking various 
indicators. As these indicators may be ambiguous and difficult to interpretl, they are used 
here in combination.  -/  ·  ...  . 
.  ::(~·.  r· 
•  As the Cardiff I Report  shows, market integration has developed over the period 1993-
97:  intra-EU trade has continued to grow with Member States increasingly trading in 
similar products (e.g.  cars for cars, rather than cars for  coal), possible evidence that 
-their industrial structures are becoming more similar.  If so, and helped by the diffusion 
of information technology, the Member States are likely to become less susceptible to 
asymmetric  economic  shocks  and  their  business  cycles  more  synchronised. 
Furthermore, the process of industrial restructuring is increasingly taking place at the 
Europea.n level, reflected by growing foreign direct· investment flows and cross-border 
merger'acti~ity. On the othet:.hand, declines in price dispersion recorded between 1985 
and 1993 carrte to a halt in th~  mor~··feceht  pe~iod::  .  . 
~  -,~;~ 
•  "~.v· 
e.  Some Member States are more closely integrated with the rest of  the EU than others, in 
particular,  Belgium-Luxembourg,  Ireland,  the  Netherlands  and  the  United  Kingdom 
(see graphs 1.1  and  1.2, plus tables  1.1  and 1.2). Greece, Italy and Austria seem less 
well integrated.· However, this might be due to factors  unrelated to markets such as 
geographical  location·'i,(Greece),  dat~ 9f accession  (Austria)  or  strikingly  different 
regional industriaf"structures (Italy) ..  ~-'  ...  .  .. 
•  '·  •  ·~.  ..~·,  ~,!!'  '  •  .  • ....  ~::,~ 
e  Despite increased intra:.Eu integration;: the indicators appear to show that EU product 
markets are somewhat less efficient than those in the United States. In 1996, the EU' s 
extra-EU trade to GDP ratio, an indicator of its exposure to external competition, was 
16% compared to  18.,8%  ~or the US, and EU consumer price levels were an average 
24% Q.igher  than in the US (see annex A).  However, many factors  may explain the 
higher price levels in the EU as compared to the US. Differences in indirect tax levels 
may account for some of this, as consumption taxes drive a 20% wedge between prices 
. paid by consumers and prices received by producers, compared to less than 7% in  the 
US2. Other explanations arc the EU's generally higher price cost margins (sec annex B) 
and  its  les_s  efficient  and  competitive  wholesale  and  retail  distribution  network. 
I  Fo~ example, firms may engage in M&A activity either to exploit the opportunities of  growing market 
integration  or·else to  try to  maintain  segmented domestic  markets.  The  data cannot distinguish 
between  the  two.  Similarly,  using  price-cost  margins  as  an  indicator  of market  integration  is 
undermined by the fact that market integration and increasing market efficiency should impact on 
both prices and costs.  . _,,,. 
2 The consumption tax wedge  is  calculated as  the ratio ·of consumption tax revenues to the  value of 
· consumption net of taxes. Since implicit consumption tax rates (see table 3.3) are calculated on the 
basis of the value of consumption including taxes, consumption tix wedges are higher than implicit 
tax rates. 
8 
.....  :  ':· 
·~-.  :.:· .. _,,;'' 
.  ·~ 
.-.<;·_A ·:t· Exchange  rate  developments  may  also  affect  relative  price  levels  expressed  m  a 
common currency. 
'  ' 
o  Average price levels differ significantly between EU Member States.  Price levels are 
particularly generally high in  Denmark, Sweden and Germany and lower in Portugal, 
Greece  and  Spain.· To  some  extent,  this  reflects  differences  in GDP  per capita and 
indirect  tax  rates  (see  table  1.3).  Nevertheless, . analysis  allows  identification  of 
. countries whose pre-tax price levels  are particularly 'striking even given their standards 
of living.  Early evidence  suggests that  prices  are  above expectations in  Finland  and 
Sweden and below in Italy and United Kingdom. Various explanations may account for 
this. The UK's record\ for example, may partly be due to its openness to international 
trade  or  to  low  price-cost  margins.  Other  countries  with  relatively  low  price-cost 
margins include Belgium and following recent declines, Germany. Sweden's price-cost 
margins are  low as  well  despite its  high price  levels.  Countries  with  relatively  high 
price-cost margins are Denmark, France and Italy. 
•  There are also· significant sectoral differences in market efficiency. The most and least 
efficient  sectors  are  not  necessarily  the  same  in  all  Member  States.  Analysis  of 
productivity developments in manufacturing sectors (see table  1.4) shows that the EU 
compares badly to the US. in pharmaceuticals, chemicals, food,  beverages and tobacco 
and  to  a· lesser  extent  ~n  transport  equipment,  precision  instruments,  electrical 
engineering  and  motor  vehicles.  In  some  of these  sectors,  EU  markets  arc  highly 
segmented due to business strategies, regulation or structural factors such as differences 
in taste or high transport costs. This market segmentation is  often reflected in a high 
degree of price dispersion  between EU  Member States (pharmaceuticals,  chemicals, 
beverages, and motor vehicles). Interestingly, taxation rates and price-cost margins in 
.some of  these sectors (pharniaceuticals, beverages) are relatively. high as welL 
•  Differences in price levels for  manufacturing products between countries also reflect 
the prices of services used in both the manufacturing and distribution of  those products. 
The relative performance of different services sectors in the various EU Member States 
has  been  assessed  by  comparing· their  prices  or  charges.  This  shows' significant 
differences between the EU Member States. Interesting sectors are wholesale ahd retail. 
trade (with high prices relative to other services sectors in  Denmark, Austria, Sweden 
and the UK), as well  as public administration (with high charges  in  Belgium, Greece 
and Luxembourg). The cost of transport and communication is  high in Ireland, whilst 
Germany and the Netherlands have high prices in real e~tate. 
Summing up, three conclusions can be 'drawn, in line with the Cardiff I Report: 
1.  Product markets within the EU are relatively well integrated, but some problem areas 
remain. High levels of price dispersion for some goods and services that mainly supply 
the  public  sector  suggest  that  public  procurement  markets  remain  relatively  poorly 
integrated.  The  weaker  integration  of service  markets  (by  comparison  with  goods 
3  However, having low  prices for a given standard of living does not necessarily imply that the long-
term economic prospects are good in  all respects. For example, as indicated in  the UK report, the 
UK has a high productivity gap relative to its European partners. In  1995, labour productivity in the 
UK business sector ranked only  13
1
h amongst 15  Member  St~tes. Further analysis is  necessary to 
explain the  UK  productivity performance. Nevertheless, this is  a matter of concern, as highlighted 
in the UK report on product, servic~s and capital markets. 
9 markets), as highlighted in the Cardiff I Report, is confirmed by the observation that 
price dispersion in services is  double that of goods.  Other indications that room  for 
improvement remains in the functioning of EU markets are the large price differences 
between Member States on the one hand, and between the EU and the US on the other 
hand. 
2.  Significant price dispersion within the  EU may  be  attributed to  one or more of the 
following  factors  - structural  (Member  States'  differences  in  living  standards  and 
tastes,  transport  costs,  etc.),  regulatory  (consumption  and  other  taxes,  non-tariff 
barriers) and firm  strategies (concentration, differentiated products, advertising,  etc.). 
Introduction of the euro;  especially by enhancing price transparency,  in combination 
with competition policy should put pressure on firms seeking to segment markets. That 
leaves regulation and taxation as areas needing further co-ordination efforts. 
3.  'Measures  to  improve the functioning  of EU  markets  would  be the  most efficient if 
targeted first at the less well-integrated countries and at major se.ctors with segmented 
markets (as reflected by significant EU-wide price dispersion, high price-cost margins 
and  poor  productivity  performance  relative  to  the  US)  - e.g.,  pharniaceutica_ls, 
chemicals,  precision  instruments,  food,  and  motor vehicles.  Similarly,  many  sectors 
(telecommunications, transport, energy and distribution) have remained sheltered from 
international competition until recently and are only now starting to enjoy the benefits 
of  liberalisation. 
1.2  Policies aiming at improving tllle lfumdioning of product maJr!kell:s 
The Single Market 
The  Single  Market  Action  Plan  has  made  a  significant  contribution  to  improving  the 
performance of  the Single Market since its adoption in June 1997. By the end of December 
1998, the fragmentation factor- i.e., the number of  directives not yet implemented in one or 
more Member States - was only  14%, down from  35% in June  1997.  Nonetheless, the 
backlog was not eliminated by 1 January 1999, when the Action Plan came to an end. Non-
transposition of directives is  worst in telecommunications, public procurement, transport, 
and intellectual and industrial property.  Amongst the  Member States, Finland, Denmark 
and Sweden have the best transposition records, Italy, Portugal and Luxembourg the worst. 
Some Member States- Austria, Germany and Sweden·- have substantially improved theit 
records between November 1997 and December 1998. 
As the Cardiff I Report says, all  Member States, ·especially those with a poor transposition 
record or where progress has been slow (Italy, Portugal, Luxembourg and  Ireland) must 
take measures to rectify the situation. The Cardiff I Report also stresses the need to monitor 
market developments in order to  identify  remaining problem areas  and ensure effective 
enforcement of  Single Market rules. 
Two problem areas stand out: lack of opening-up of  public procurement and differences i.n 
technical standards between Member States (technical trade barriers continue to hinder ar, 
estimated 63% of intra-EU trade).  Public purchasing is economicaliy important- equal to 
an estimated  11  to  12% of EU GOP in 1997- and often characterised by weak suppher 
competition.  Poor record in transposition of the directives but also local preference aUil  a 
reluctance to change suppliers explain this situation. For some Member States, imprcvlng 
access  to  public  procurement  contracts  is  a  priority.  France,  for  example,  intc;1d:  :  ... · 
'.  l •.  ,. accelerate  reform  in  1999  specifically  to  improve  transparency  and  openness  in  public 
procurement,· especially for SMEs.  Much more use of electronic commerce is a key plank 
of their  strategy,  an  approach  shared  by  the  UK  whose  government  is  committed  to 
purchasing 90% of central government goods electronically by March 2001.  However, as 
indicated  in  the  Cardiff I Report and in  a  majority of the  national  progress reports,  the 
efforts to promote greater competition in this field have not yet produced sufficient tangible 
benefits.  Therefore, this is an area to which the Commission will attach special attention in 
the future reports. 
Correct and uniform enforcement of the legislation is  also needed, but this is not always 
happening - the number of infringement proceedings opened by the Commission against 
Member  States  for  alleged  failure  to  apply  Single  Market  rules  continues  to  grow. 
Generally,  such  enforcement  problems  concern  the  large  Member  States.  However, 
amongst the  large  Member States,  the  French record  is  particularly  bad,  whilst the  UK 
record is particularly good.  Amongst the small Member States, Greece and Belgium have 
the worst records.  Beyond legislation, other problems continue to fragment Member State 
markets  including complicated national  and  local  regulations,  state aids,  difficulties with 
VAT  systems,  and  deliberate  market-segmenting  business  strategies,  especially  in  the 
distribution sector,  designed to make cross-border market access difficult. 
Competition policy 
The Single Market has had a strong pro-competitive effect, which will  be reinforced by 
EMU and ongoing technological progress such as  electronic commerce.  However,  a  risk 
exists that companies whose market powe'r is threatened by such developments will attempt 
to  maintain  their  position  through  anti-competitive  behaviour.  Furthermore,  increased 
competitive pressure resulting from monetary union may lead to new demands for state aid 
to  support  firms  and  sectors.  Competition  policy  (including  the  control  of state  aid) . 
therefore  has  an  important  role  to  play  in  safeguarding  or  enhancing the  flexibility  of 
product and service markets. 
A number of Member States have recently adopted new competition legislation bringing 
national  law  more  closely  into  line  with ·that  of the  Community  (Denmark  and  the 
Netherlands in 1997, Germany, Finland and the UK in  1998). In eight Member States4,  the 
national  competition  authorities  now have  powers  to  enforce  Articles  85-86 · of the  EC 
Treaty,  dealing  with  agreements  between  enterprises  and  abuse  of dominant  positions. 
From 2000, the UK competition authority will  also  have such  powers. This arrangement 
helps streamline enforcement of these articles, as responsibility otherwise falls on national  . 
courts  or the  Commission.  Competition  law  enforcement  has  also  been  tightened  up  in 
Spain  and  Sweden,  whilst  the  Austrian  government  has  announced  its  intention  of 
introducing  legislation  to  create  an  independent  Cartel  ·Office  and  align  Austrian 
competition law more closely with that of  the Community. 
Even if  the amount of  approved State aids has slightly declined since 1990, they remain one 
of the major sources of distortions within the Single Market. Over the period 1994-1996, 
total non-agricultural aids represented 1.4% of  the Community's GDP (84 billion ECU per 
year), compared to 1.7% in the period of the previous survey (1992-1994). However, aid 
levels  are  still  high in Italy  (2.1% of GOP)  and  Germany  (1.9%).  On the  other  hand, 
4 Belgium, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal. 
II Finland, the U.K., Austria and the Netherlands have very low levels of aid (between 0.4% 
and 0.7% of GDP). Although the trend in  state aid shows an encouraging overall decline, 
aid to the coal industry and resq.Ic and restructuring aid arc two areas of particular concern 
and regional aid needs closer scrutiny. 
In particular, the Commission has noted a worrying increase in the amount of  aid granted to 
rescue and  restructure firms  in  difficulty.  Excluding aid  granted  in  the context of special 
measures for the new German Landers, the share of such aid in the total  increased from 6% 
in  1992  to  16% in  1996.  France,  Italy and  Spain accounted  for  more than  80% of this 
rescue and restructuring aid.  As noted in France's report on economic reform, preference 
should be given to generic measures to improve the ability of  firms to adapt and innovate. 
The Commission will maintain a strict application of Community state aid rules,  but the 
Member  States  themselves  have  to  institute  more  sustained  discipline.  The  exercise of 
stricter self-discipline might be facilitated by  a concerted effort of all  Member States  to 
reduce  the  overall  level  of aids.  As the  Cardiff I  Report  recommends,  Member States 
should set precise obje:ctives and establish a timetable for the reduction of state aids. They 
should  also  modify  the  structure  of state  aids  to  redirect  them  away  from  ad  hoc  and 
sectoral aids towards aids designed to correct market distortions (such as aid in  favour of 
SMEs, R&D). 
Market liberalisation and regulatory reforms 
Market liberalisation generally accofupanies  regulatory reforms.· An improvement in the 
regulatory environment does not necessarily mean deregulation and it may also entail re-
regulation provided that the new· rules are better adapted to the new economic environment. 
Efforts  to  simplify  and  avoid  unnecessary  regulatory  burdens  on  business  have  been 
pursued at the Community level, notably through the SLIM initiative. The Cardiff I Report 
sugges~s applying the same methodology to national regulations. 
The  issue  of  reguhtion  is  particularly  important  for  the  network  industries 
(telecommunications,  postal  services,  air-,  rail- and  urban transport,  electricity,  gas  and 
water), retail distribution, road freight transport and financial services (this last is discussed 
in Chapter 2).  · 
Network  industries  make  up  5%  of EU  GDP  and  employment,  but  their  economic 
importance is still greater because the price and quality of their outputs is essential for the 
growth and competitiveness ofEuropean industries, for the operation of  the Internal Market 
and  for  the  European  consumers'  living standards  . This  is  reflected  by  the  importance 
attached  to  this  issue  in  the  national  country  reports  and  in  the  Cardiff I  Report.  The 
regulatory regime of some of these sectors can also affect the functioning of TENs which 
are vital for the integrati:on of  European product markets. 
Due  to  many  factors,  including  technical  change  and  fiscal  constraints,  a  gradual  and 
differentiated  liberalism:ion  process  is  taking  place at  the EU  level  via  a  wide  array  of 
legislative measures de!;igned to open up markets while permitting Member States to take 
appropriate steps to  en:mre  the  fulfilmen.t  of universal  service obligations.  However, the 
progress  of  liberalisati.on  varies  greatly  between  countries  and  sectors.  In  general, 
5 Aid granted by the Treuhandanstalt and successor organisations. 
J2 liberalisation  has  advanced ·furthest  in  the  UK  andr the  Nordic  countries,  where 
liberalisation  in  several  sectors  has  preceded  the  enactment of relevant  EU · 9irectives. 
According to the national reports, other countries have made significant progress over the 
recent period as well -e.g., Germany (in railways and postal services), the Netherlands (in 
railways},  and  Spain  (in  electricity).  Within  Member  States  there  can  also  be  wide 
variations between sectors. For example, Spain's new electricity law, adopted in  1997, goes 
well beyond the requirements of  the EU Directive. 
Liberalisation is most advanced in the telecommunications, road haulage and non.:reserved 
. postal services. In air transport progress has been made as  well, but bilateral "open skies" 
agreements and the system of slot allocation pose important obstacles to competition. By 
contrast; liberalisation is only starting in the energy sectors and very much slower in the 
water  and  railway  sectors.  Evidence  provided  in  the  Commission's  Fourth  Report  on 
Implementation of the Telecommunications Regulatory Package6,  as well as in  the national 
reports show.s a link between liberalisation and lower prices. For example, countries such as 
Germany,  France,  Finland,  the  Netherlands  and  the  United  Kingdom  reported  falls  in 
telecom prices following liberalisation. In the electricity sector, price reductions occurred in 
Germany, Spain, Finland and the United Kingdom and in regional transport in Denmark 
and Sweden. 
However,  changes  brought  about  by  competitiOn  can  sometimes  i1Tiply  short-term 
adjustment costs Gob losses). These adjustment costs pose three major policy challenges: 
1.  Acceptance of  the liberalisation process will be greateF if its positive effects in terms of 
pr,ices,  choice, quality and universality of services are clearly identified. Therefore, as 
the  Cardiff I .  Report  says,  the  Member states  should  ensure that  these  benefits  are 
transmitted to industrial users and consumers without delay. Effective and independent 
regulatory  authorities  are  therefore  essential.  However,  in· many  Member States the 
regulatory authorities have been set up only recently and have yet to develop adequate 
expertise. In some sectors (e.g. railways, electricity and gas) many Member States have 
not yet established regulatory authorities 
·  2.  In  some cases,  workable competition within the  market  is  difficult or impossible to 
achieve, e.g. the management of infrastructure, which constitutes a natural monopoly. 
'In such cases, it may nevertheless be possible to achieve efficiency gains by instituting 
competition for the market, i.e.  by  awarding .contracts or licences for the provision of 
the services in question on the basis of a public tendering procedure. This approach has 
been  followed  with  various  degrees  of success  in  the  field  of local  and  regional 
passenger transport in Denmark, Sweden and the UK. 
3.  Many services provided by the network industries have come to be regarded as essential. 
public  services  which  should  be  widely  available  at  "affordable"  prices  and  with 
assured  quality .. As  the  free  operation  of the  market  may· not  always  meet  these 
requirements, Member States may impose universal service obligations. The definition. 
of these obligations, their financing and  the selectior of the enterprises charged with 
carrying them out should not create unnecessary distortions of  the market or impede.the 
process of integration. 
6 COM(1998)594 of25 November 1998. 
13 Retail distribution in Europe is another sector subject to  a number of types of regulation 
that  could  impede  efficiency  and  contribute  to  higher  price  levels.  Apart  from  labour 
market  regulations,  these  include  restrictions  on  land  use  and  opening  hours.  The 
importance of these restrictions varies widely between Member States. In the Netherlands 
there are very few 'Hypermarkten', mainly due to  land-use planning regulations. In most 
Member States, local authorities are the main decision-making bodies in the field of land-
use planning, but some countries (Belgium, Germany, France, and  Portugal) also impose 
restrictions  at  the  national  level.  Special  problems  may  arise  when  the  authorities  are 
subject to  strong pressure  from  small traders  to  block the  establishment of large  shops. 
Opening hours are still subject to significant restrictions in Germany, Austria, Portugal and 
Finland, although in Germany and Austria, the restrictions have been relaxed over the last 
two years.  Germany plans to review the situation in the middle of 1999. A wide-ranging 
liberalisation of  the retail sector is being implemented in Italy. 
Finally, in the road freight transport sector, Greece and Italy still apply prite controls on 
domestic road freight transport. 
SMEs and entrepreneurship 
SMEs account for between 60% (the Netherlands) and 80% (Italy) of employment in the 
EU7.  SMEs are also the major drivers of net job creation as  entrepreneurs start up  new 
enterprises and small enterprises grow. However, as less than half of SMEs survive beyond 
five years, they also account for a large part of  gross job losses. 
In recent years, governments have become increasingly aware of  obstacles hindering SMEs 
from exploiting their full job creating potential. The main obstacles have been identifi~d as 
lack of access to capital (see Chapter 2) and administrative burdens. The result is less job 
creation, and reduced competitive and innovative pressures on markets. The USA seems to 
set  better  conditions  for  job  creation  especially  by  SMEs.  The  average  number  of 
procedures, for example, to establish a company in Europe is II, against 6 in the USA. 
Many Member States are well aware of  these difficulties and have undertaken progran1mes 
and measures to improve the conditions for SMEs, including simplification of legislation, 
especially relating to start-ups (Germany, France, Sweden, Denmark), small size thresholds 
for  administrative  burdens  (Netherlands),  consulting  procedures  (Denmark),  etc.  In 
addition, some Member States have lightened tax burdens on SMEs (France, Spain) and 
there  are  a  number  of schemes  for  providing  guarantees  or  subsidised  loans.  At  the 
Community level measures have been undertaken as ·well. The BEST report and the related 
Commission Action Plans recently came up with recommendations on how to improve the 
regulatory  environment  on  the  European  level  and  the  Business  Test  Panel  has  been 
established to  assess  the  compliance costs  and  administrative  burdens  linked  with  new 
legislative proposals. 
R&D and innovation 
Europe lags behind both the USA and Japan in terms of innovative capacity. R&D intensity 
in the EU was  1. 9 % of GOP in  1996, against 2.6 % in  USA and 2.8 % ( 1995) in Japan. 
7 European Observatory for SME, Annual Report 1997. 
8 "Promoting entrepreneurship and competitiveness", COM (1998) 550 of30/9/1998. 
14 The level ofR&D expenditure by European companies is 1.2% ofGDP, against 1.8% for 
American firms and 2 % (1995) for the Japanese9,  Within Europe, Sweden has the highest 
level of R&D expenditure (3.5 %) followed by a group of  countries with shares around 2% 
(Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK ).  Another group can be 
identified around 1.5  %  (Austria, Belgium and Ireland). Finally, Italy, Greece, Spain and 
Portugal have percentages of  R&D expenditures equal to or below 1 %. 
R&D  expenditure  tends  to  be  concentrated  in  high-technology  sectors  like  aerospace, 
computers,  electronics,  chemicals,  pharmaceuticals  and  motor vehicles.  However,  only 
13% of EU expo_rts  are high-tech products,  around half the share in Japan or the USA. 
Furthermore, the EU trade balance in  high-tech products has  been worsening  in recent 
years. Though the EU performs relatively well in scientific research (NSE graduation rates, 
PhD awards, publications, etc.)  this does not translate  into  technological  and economic 
performance. For example, only 48 ·% of  patents applied for in the European Patent Office 
stem from European industry. There is thus a scope for improving the EU patent system. 
Similarly, the EU is lagging behind the USA regarding the development of commercially 
relevant innovation and their diffusion. 
The importance of R&D and innovation has long been recognised by the Commission. In 
this respect, the first Action Plan for Innovationto and the  5th Framework Programme for 
research,  technological developments and demonstration activities! I  are  the main policy 
instruments  of the  EU.  However,  according  to  reports  on  economic  reforms,  several . 
Member  States have  also  taken  measures  to  promote  R&D and  innovation.  Spain  has . 
. identified a  need to strengthen R&D and innovation and has introduced new tax incentives 
and other measures to promote industrial innovation. In France, the high costs of patents 
and an unsatisfactory venture capital market have been identified as barriers and a new act 
on the exploitation of research will soon be introduced. In the UK, SMEs' R&D record is. 
poor~ so the Government is considering new measures to tighten relations between SMEs 
and  centres  for  higher  education.  Austria  has  put  aside  1  billion  A  TS  (revenue  from 
privatisation) to increase R&D spending and co-operation between science and business.· 
2. FINANC-IAL MARKETS 
2.1  Progress infinancial integration 
Monetary union has come,  at a time of increased competit!on in the financial field as 
a result of  the completion of the Internal Market, continuing deregulation of financial . 
markets in general, and rapid technological progress. As a result of the interaction of 
these  processes,  there  will  be  an  acceleration  in  the  emergence  of an  integrated 
European financial market. This market should be more liquid, mature and efficient 
than existing national markets. 
Key features of  financial markets in the EU include the following: 
9 S~cond  European Report on S & Tindicators, Key Figures, May 1998. 
10 First Action Plan for Innovation in Europe, ISBN 92-827-9111-4. 
11  5th Framework Programme of  the E~ropean Comm~ity  for Research, Technological Developments 
and  Demonstration Activities  (1998-2000)", Decision  of the  European  Parliament  and  Council 
(22.12.98). 
15 o  VIewed as. a single set of  markets, the value of  EU  bonds, equities, and bank loans 
in  European capital  markets totalled more than $27 trillion at the end of 1995. 
That compared to $23 trillion in the US capital markets, and $16 trillion in Japan. 
At the  same  time,  domestic  equity  markets  are  relatively  small.  In  1996  the 
combined domestic market capitalisation of all  15  EU equity markets was around 
US$  3.5  trillion,.compared tp well over US$  6.5  trillion for  the New York and 
NASDAQ markets.  Following the introduction of the  euro,  EU  equity markets 
will profit from a wider investor base and a larger, more efficient market. 
"  Although the  integration of financial  markets  is  advanced,  obstacles to  further 
integration  remain.  These  barriers . have  been ·identified  in  the  Commission 
Communication "Financial services:  a framework  for action" (COM(l998) 625 
Final) and were discussed in the Cardiff I Report. They include differences in the 
interpretation  and  implementation  of  (EU)  financial  market  legislation;  the 
absence  df harmonisation  measures  in  some  areas  such  as  pension  funds; 
differences in  national fiscal  regimes; and technical  barriers, for example in  the 
field  of payment systems.  Given the  importance of financial  services  in  the  EU 
. economy (some 6% of EU  GDP and for 2.5% of EU  employment - substantially 
higher in the UK), it is essential that these barriers to integration be removed. 
G  Badly functioning  financial. markets impact especially on SMEs.  SMEs are very 
dependent on banks and tend to pay higher interest rates than larger enterprises. In 
1996, for example, the share of financial debt was 37% in SMEs against 28% in 
·large enterprises12. Yet, SMEs have much less bargaining power with banks. New 
and rapidly growing firms may also face credit rationing due to lack of  collateral. 
SMEs often do not have access to stock exchanges or other regulated markets for 
capital. Private equity and venture capital markets for SMEs are in most Member 
States  quite  small  and  insignificant.  This,  in  combination  with  substantial 
minimum capital requirements - particularly high in Austria and Germany .;_  may 
hinder the creation o{  new firms. 
These observations lead to the following conclusions: 
1.  More integrated capital and credit markets should greatly enhance the capacity of 
Member States to respond to shocks in EMU. Capital markets help in smoothing 
shocks by facilitating adjustment via the cross ownership of productive assets and 1 
. through lending and borrowing on national credit markets. ·  · : 
2.  The need to  remove  the  remaining  obstacles  to  financial  markets,  including  a  . 
better access  o.f SMEs to  risk capital,  Is  clearly acknowledged,  and  a  series of 
actions at national and EU level are underway as described below. 
3.  The-removal of currency risk, which the introduction of the euro entails, means 
that institutional investors are no longer limited to domestic ma~kets, but can seek 
out the opportunities provided by the increased depth and  liquidity of the whole 
euro-denominated market.  Nevertheless,  quantitative  restrictions  remain  on  the 
type of  asset in which investments can be made. These both distort the structure of 
12  European Commission, BACH-database .. 
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'• 
,.• institutional  investor  portfolios  and  reduce  competition  m  the  single  financial 
market. 
2. 2 The EU  response 
· As recalled in the Cardiff I report, three key developments in  1998 have the aim of 
ensuring further integration of  European financial markets. First, as mentioned above, 
the  Commission's  Communication  identified  the  key  remaining  barriers  to  the 
integration  of financial  markets  and  actions  for  dealing  with  them.  Second,  in 
response to the  Communication, Ministers of Finance agreed to  create a temporary 
high level group, to be chaired by the Commission, which will submit a report to the 
ECOFIN Council in June 1999 identifying the political priorities for the completion of 
the single market in the area of wholesale and retail financial  services. Thirdly, the 
Commission published a Communication on "Risk Capital: a key to job creation in 
the  EU"  (SEC  (98)  552)  and  proposed  an  Action  Plan  of measures  necessary  to · 
facilitate the development of  a European risk capital market. 
As to specific measures, the EU has created the Eurotech Capital scheme to promote 
the provision of venture capital for cross-border high-technology projects undertaken 
by SMEs and has recently  launched a number of new venture capital initiatives. A 
new start up equity financing scheme has been launched by ElF. 
2.3 National reforms are taking off 
Legal/regulatory framework 
The  legal  and  the  regulatory  framework  in  Member  States  is  undergoing  major 
changes. In some cases, these changes are broad reaching in scope as in the UK, with 
the establishment of a single statutory regulator, the Financial Services Authority and 
the  enactment of the  Financial  Services  and Markets  Bill,  and  in  France where  a 
proposed law on savings and financial security should improve the organisation ·and 
operation of supervision in the financial sector. Improving the overall efficiency and 
competitiveness of the financial sector is also the aim of the Third Financial Market 
Promotion Law in Germany (amending laws on stock exchanges and securities, on 
investment  companies,  and  on  equity  investment  companies),  and  of the  Capital 
markets law in Spain. Other reforms are more specific in nature, aiming, for example, · 
to improve the efficiency of  mutual funds by increasing the scope of their investment 
activities (Spain), or to improve the funding of investments in the public interest by 
amending rules governing interest on private savings ("livret A" in France). 
Stock markets 
The  stock exchanges  of euro  area  Member  States  switched  to  quoting  all  listed 
securities in euro at the beginning of 1999.  Broader ranging structural reforms have 
been underway for some time with the aim of making markets more competitive and 
ac;cessible to a wider range of users. These reforms have taken the form, for example 
of transforming  stock  exchanges  from  public  institutions  into  private .corporations 
(Italy and Austria), and the integration of futures and derivatives exchanges with the 
major ·stock exchange (Austria and Belgium).  Co~operation among stock exchanges 
with  the  aim,  for  example,  of sharing  technology,  has  also  been  important  (for 
example, the Vienpa and Frankfurt exchanges). More broadly, the agreement among 
17 nine  European  stock  exchanges  (London,  Frankfurt,  Paris,  Amsterdam,  Brussels, 
Madrid,  Milan,  Stockholm· and,  outside  the  EU,  Zurich)  to  work  together  .on 
establishing the basis for· a pan-European equity market, is a significant development. 
The creation of a network of "New Markets" for young expanding firms has been an 
important  development  in  Germany,  France,  Belgium,  the  Netherlands,  and  most 
recently in Italy. This network will expand in  1999 to include Sweden and Denmark. 
Other developments  which  arc  facilitating  the  access of SMEs  to  capital  markets 
include the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) in  the UK  and the European-wide 
EASDAQ. 
Venture capital and access ofsmall businesses to financing. 
In the recent past a variety of initiatives have begun in the Member States to facilitate 
financing  for  SMEs  and  for  start  ups.  In  some  cases  these  are  specific  financing 
programmes or funds  (in Austria, "seed-financing", a Business Angels Initiative, a 
"High Tech Venture Fund",  and a  "Young Entrepreneur Assistance  Programme"); 
while in others the legal framework has been made more favourable:  in  Spain new 
regulations allow venture capital providers greater flexibility in investment decisions, 
and changes in the regulation of Reciprocal Guarantee Companies make the system 
more  accessible  to  business.  The  government  also  intends  to  facilitate  the 
securitisation of loans  to  companies  by  providing  guarantees  which  should  be  of 
particular benefit to small companies .. 
Other actions are broader in nature. In Ireland, 75% of the recommendations of  Task 
Force on Small Business on tackling _problems such as raising capital, rewarding risk 
and reducing administrative burdens have been fully  or partially  implemented.  The 
Small Business and Services Forum will complete a review of  these recommendations 
in the light of the changing environment in which business operates by early 1999. In 
Spain an SME Observatory has been set up to study how red tape for SMEs might be 
reduced and access to external finance  improved.  Finally, as barriers to  exit inhibit 
risk  taking,  some  Member  States  (France,  the  Netherlands)  are  also  planning  to 
review bankruptcy regulations to make failure less punitive for entrepreneurs. 
Corporate governance 
The Risk Capital Action Plan has also recognised that good corporate governance is 
essential for stimulating the development of capitaJ. markets.  Again Member States 
have undertaken a variety of actions. In Italy reforms to the regulatory framework in 
1998 substantially modified the system of corporate governance, particularly in  the 
fields of minority shareholders' protection and the contestability of control of listed 
companies. In France the Company Law Act will be reformed in 1999 to improve the 
transparency  of  companies  vis-a-vis  their  shareholders,  particularly  minority 
shareholder.  Provisions  for  compulsory  administration  or  liquidation  proceedings 
which can be lengthy and inefficient will  also  be  reviewed  in  1999.  In Belgium a 
flexible  approach has  been adopted,  relying  on  self-regulation and the pressure. of 
financial markets themselves rather than on the legal or regulatory framework. Three 
voluntary  codes  on  principles  of corporate  governance  were  published  at  the 
beginning  of  1998  by  the  Belgian  Stock  Exchange,  the  Belgian- Federation  of 
Enterprises, and the Banking and Finance Commission. 
3. LABOUR MARKETS 
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• 3.1 High structural unemployment, but a strongly diversified picture 
Twenty years ago the EU employment rate matched that in the US. By  I 997 it was I  4 
percentage points lower, at 60.5% compared with 74% in the US. Over the period 
1985-97, the employment rate remained virtually unchanged overall, while in the US 
(and Japan) they increased significantly. Unemployment in the EU averaged 10.6% of 
the labour force il)  1997, only slightly lower than the peak rate in 1994 and over twice 
the rate in the US (4.9%).  Whereas the rate in the US has fallen steadily since the 
early 1980s, apart frorri during the recession of 1990-92, the rate in the EU has shown 
an upward trend since the mid-I 970s  13.  · 
As shown in tables  3. I  and 3 .2,  and graph  3.1, these  aggregate figures,  however, 
conceal a highly diversified scenario. In summary: 
•  There  are  considerable  differences  among  Member  States.  Austria,  Denmark, 
Sweden and the UK have employment rates of  about 70% and above, compared to 
around 50% or below in Italy and Spain. Within the euro area large differences 
exist between Member States. Whilst unemployment· remains high, though on a 
decreasing path, in Spain (over 20%) and· is  I2-13% in Italy, France and Finland; 
it  has  decreased  substantially  in  countries  like  the  Netherlands  and ·Ireland. 
Outside the euro area, unemployment is low in DK and the UK, but it remains 
relatively high in Sweden.· 
•  Within a  number of countries, there exist striking regional  differences:  in Italy, 
Germany, Spain, Belgium and Finland, situations of  relatively low unemployment · 
in certain regions  co-exist with very  high  unemployment  in  other parts of the 
country. 
•  An  analysis  of employment  rates  by  age  group  shows  where  the  differences 
between the EU and the US lie. While employment rates for prime age males (25-
54) are very similar to the US, employment rates for yourig people (15-24), for 
prime age womeri and for older people (55-64), especially men, are much lower in 
Europe than in the US. However, the unemployment rate for EU prime age males 
(8.1% in 1997) is significantly above the US level. Unemployment is particularly 
high for the.case of  these disadvantaged categories of labour. A hard core of long 
temi, hard  to  place  unemployed  is  mainly  composed of females,  low  ~killed, 
youngsters and older workers. 
•  As a share of  total working age population, EU employment amounted in  1997 to · 
3.1  % in agriculture,  18.2 %  in industry and 39.2 % in serviCes.  For the US, the 
corresponding  figures  are  2.0  %,  17.7  %  and  54.2%.  Future  increases  in  the 
overall EU employment rate will depend on an expansion of  jobs in  services for 
which there is considerable potential. 
These observations indicate the following: 
1.  The . vast  array  of differences  across  countries,  compared  to  the  increasing 
homogeneity in ·the business cycle, especially in the euro zone, suggests ·that the 
13  Employment in Europe 1998, p.9 
19 rise  in unemployment is  not a  simple effect of inappropriate aggregate demand 
management. 
2.  Countries such as  the  UK,  Denmark,  Netherlands,  Ireland  and,  more  recently, 
Spain, have undertaken a more integrated approach to  structural  reforms, rather 
than scattered measures. As to labour market reforms, in the Netherlands, Ireland 
and Spain, these reforms were introduced in agreement with the social partners. 
Although  important  problems  remain  in  those  countries,  the  reform  package, 
together with high growth of GDP in  the  past years,  has contributed to· reduce 
structural unemployment. 
3.  The  difference  in  regional  unemployment  in  several  countries,  apart  from 
highlighting the importance of regional and cohesion policies, also points to the 
need to take into account the highly differentiated levels of  productivity and, more 
generally, economic development, into their collective bargaining. 
3.2 The EU  response 
As  laid  out  in  the  Broad  Economic  Policy  Guidelines  and  confirmed  in  the  EU 
employment  strategy,  tackling  unemployment  requires  a  sound,  stability-oriented 
macroeconomic framework coupled with structural reforms. As an ex ante application 
of the  new Employment  Title  of the  Amsterdam  Treaty,  a  co-operative  effort  in 
overhauling Europe's employment systems was put in place in the Jobs Summit in 
Luxembourg in November 1997. The process was further strengthened by the Vienna 
European Council in December 1998 which stated that employment policy has to be 
embedded  in  a  comprehensive  approach  encompassing  macroeconomic  policies 
directed towards growth and stability, economic reform promoting competitiveness, 
and  the  Employment  Guidelines.  It  mentioned  that  the  surveillance  of ·the 
implementation of  the Guidelines- to be carried out via the Joint Employment Report 
- is an essential element of  the Luxembourg process, which needs to be reinforced.  It 
invited the Commission to present a communication on  mainstreaming employment 
policies at Community level. 
The Employment Guidelines represents an integrated strategy organised  under the 
four  headings  of  employability,  entrepreneurship,  adaptability  and  equal 
opportunities. Whilst it is still too early for a thorough evaluation; the Luxembm,rrg 
process has helped to focus the political attention on the employment challenge and 
has acted as a catalyst for a co-operative efforts in fostering structural reforms in the 
Member  States.  The  European  Employment  Pact  put  forward  by  the  German 
. Presidency  aims  at strengthening  further  the  EU  strategy  and  making  it  more 
compelling.  ·  · 
3.3 Responses by national governments and social partners 
EU Member States are not starting from scratch in the process of structural reform. In 
many areas, important progress has been accomplished. Social partners have played a 
vital role iri the reform process. However, a lot remains to be done, as pointed out by 
the European Council in Vienna which asked Member States, in  order to support the 
commitments in the NAPs, to define policies and set themselves additional quantified 
targets and deadlines at national level.  This includes promoting equal opportunities, 
making progress in lifelong  learning,  exploiting the  potential of the service sector, 
20 creating  a  better  business  climate,  exammmg  tax-benefit  systems,  supporting  the 
participation of  older workers, and promoting the inclusion of  disadvantaged groups. 
The  Commission intends to  take  up these  points with Member States and  monitor 
progress in the context of  the submission of Member States' National Action Plans for 
1999.  As a contribution to this work the present report concentrates on tax-benefit  - .  . 
systems, including the reduction of labour costs for the low-skilled. 
Reforms of  tax andbenejit systems . 
The need to  reform tax and benefit systems to tackle the problem of high structural 
unemployment has long been part of  the EU political agenda and are taken up in both 
the  1998 Broad Economic Policy Guidelines and the 1999 Employment Gui.delines. 
Progress  in  most ·countries  in  implementing  taxation  reforms  is  still  gradual. 
Considerations  of  revenue  loss  have  prevented  many  Member  States  from 
implementing taxation reforms to foster job creation more vigorously·. 
Europe's social protection systems need to adapt to meet existing demand and respond 
to new needs, changing circumstances and the increasing pressure to contain costs. At 
the  same time they  should  str~ngthen economic growth and job creation, and shift 
towards  a  more  active  policy  designed· to  get people  into  employment rather  than 
merely transferring income to them when they arc not working. 
Such  reforms  are  under  way  throughout  the  EU,  with  the  emphasis  on  curbing 
expenditure growth and dependency on social protection. Eligibility criteria have been 
tightened, with stricter definitions of availability for work and tougher sanctions on 
those refusing to take up a job (or a training course). The duration of benefits and/or 
replacement  ratios  have  been  reduced  in  an  attempt  to  curb  alleged  work 
disincentives. In-work benefits to top up low wages have been modified to minimise 
the risk of 'poverty traps'. Action to curb high marginat" effective tax rates has been 
taken in several countries. Lower marginal taxes, by affecting wage setting, may also 
have positive effects on labour demand.  · 
A number of targeted measures to reduce labour costs for the low-skilled have been 
put in  place  to  increase  the  demand  for  low-skilled  labour.  In  many  cases,  these . 
measures  were  implemented  in  the  context of reforms  of tax  and  benefit  systems 
aiming at reducing marginal effective tax rates. Whilst reductions in non-wage labour 
costs may be useful,  it is important that they  are  comple~ented by  effective active 
labour market policies to  improve human capital.  Furthermore, agreements between 
the  social partners and labour and product market reforms are  important to prevent 
reductions. in non-wage labour costs simply being offset, as  so  often in  the past, by 
increases in profits or direct wages. 
Work organisation and working time flexibility 
A radical approach to innovation in the workplace is paramount to adapt to industrial 
change. This is obviously a matter mainly for social partners.  As pointed out by  an  -
Expert  Group  on  the  Evolution  of Labour  Law  in  Europe  (the  Madrid  Group), 
collective  agreements  are  gaining  ground  as  an  instrument  for  finding  a  balance 
between different interests in workirig life,  and collective bargaining, though in the· 
midstofreorganisatiort, is highly adaptive.  · 
21 An important aspect of organisation innovation is  working time flexibility.  In most 
Member States working time flexibility is still relatively low, whereas regulations and 
collective agreements often allow more flexibility than is actually utilised. In addition, 
recently, Austria and  Spain undertook significant steps to  liberalise working hours,  .  -
but also in France, Italy, Finland and Greece regulations restricting unusual working 
hours  were  eased  during  the  nineties.  In  Belgium,  Spain  and  France  it  became 
possible for  the  social  partners to  agree  on the  annualisation of working hours.  In 
Austria it became possible to exchange overtime with time off.  Besides, in countries 
like  Germany  or  Portugal,  enterprises  and  social  partners  increasingly  usc  the 
flexibility offered in existing legislation. 
Reducing the weekly working time has been a prominent feature for European policy 
makers. If  well designed, these working time reductions can lead to a redistribution of 
work towards the  unemployed,  as  some  company  examples  show.  This,  however, 
requires several, often difficult-to-meet conditions, among others cost neutrality or the 
availability of suitable replacements from the stock of unemployed. Across the board 
working time reductions not agreed with the social partners are likely to  be counter-
productive as they risk increasing unemployment, in the short run, and be inconsistent 
with preparing for the ageing of  the population, in the longer run. Removing obstacles 
to  voluntary part-time work or allowing  social  partners to  bargain  the  appropriate 
working time at the company or branch level, as in the Netherlands (over 35% of  part-
time workers on total employment),  Denmark and  Sweden (between  20  and  30%) 
may help fostering employment opportunities. 
Reforms of  employment protection legislation 
An  employment-friendly  regulatory  framework  is  important  to  foster  structural 
change and respond to economic shocks. The key issue for workers, management, the 
social partners and policy makers alike is to strike the right balance betweenjlexibility 
and security.  Italy,  Spain  or  Portugal  are  traditionally  seen  to  have  the  strictest 
Employment Protection Legislation (EPL)  among the  Member States, whereas  it  is 
generally considered that EPL is  least strict in the UK and Denmark. In some low-
protection countries, including Denmark, however, ·employment protection clauses are 
embodied  in  collective  agreements.  Recent  reforms  in  the  area  EPL  have  been 
undertaken  by  the  Netherlands,  Portugal  and  Spain.  In  Spain,  in  particular,  the 
approach of liberalisation "at the margin" which had aggravated the segmentation of 
the labour market between permanent and temporary workers in  the  1980s, has been 
reversed with the agreement of the social partners. In a number of countries (notably 
Italy), job-security requirements have been eased in  the context of policy packages 
aimed at tackling regional unemployment. Whilst most of  the recent changes go in the 
direction of making job-security provisions more flexible, in some countries, such as 
Fr;mce,·  EPL became tighter during the nineties,  and in Germany the new coalition 
government is planning to  reverse a recent law facilitating dismissals especially for 
SMEs. 
Whilst  strict  EPL  should  not  be  singled  out  as  causing  the  high  European 
unemployment, adequate job-security provisions combining flexibility and security at 
work are important for increasing employment and adjusting to shocks. Further EPL 
reforms in countries with strict regulations would reduce labour market segmentation. 
To  achieve  the  right  balance  betwec·n  flexibility  and.  security,  the  Employment 
Guidelines invite social  partners to negotiate at ali  appropriate levels agreements tc 
22 modernise the organisation of work,  inCluding flexible working amingements, with 
the aim of  making undertakings productive and competitive, Public authorities should 
provide the enabling framework for this. 
4. PUBLIC FINANCES 
Both the size and the structure of public expenditures and taxation have an  important . 
impact on economic efficiency. As shown  in  tables 4.1  to  4.3, the  broad  picture of 
public finances in the EU is the following: 
•  The size of  the public sector in the EU is large compared with the US or Japan. In 
1998,  total  government  €xpenditures  amounted  to  48%  of EU  GDP,  which 
compares with 34% in the US and 38% in Japan. Accordingly, the lax revenue, as 
a per cent of GDP in the EU (43%) was at least 12 percentage points higher than 
in  the  US  (31 %)  and  in  Japan  (28%).  However,  EU  averages  conceal  wide 
differences across Member States. The size of public sector within the EU ranges 
from a maximum of  62% of  the GDP in Sweden to a minimum of 31% in Ireland. 
•  A  distinguishing feature of EU countries is the size of the welfare state. Current 
transfers to households (which include pensions, health care and unemployment 
and other benefits) amount to almost 20% of the GDP in the EU, and it is above 
this figure in the euro zone, compared with 14% in the US and 16% in Japan. In 
some Member States (B, F, L, NL) this indicator of social protection amounts to 
23-24% of the GDP, while in others (GR, E, IRL, P, UK) the shares are as low as 
12-17%.  .  . 
•  All  in  all,  there  is  a  quite  significant  correlation  between  levels  of welfare 
spending and the degree of  economic development. Apart from the UK, the lowest 
levels of social protection in the EU are found in the cohesion countries~ It should 
also be borne in  mind that the differences in the level  of spending on  welfare 
services  in  industrial  countries  arc  much  more  limited  when  both  public  and 
private  spending  are  taken  into  account.  For  instance,  the  difference  in  total 
welfare spending between the two _countries  at the opposite end of the spectrum, 
Sweden and the US,  is  reduced to  some 7 points of GDP (35% of the  GDP in 
Sweden and 28% in the US).  · 
o  Whilst EU countries have widely different tax structures,. a common element, with 
few exceptions, is the high tax burden on labour - and especially on low-skilled 
workers  - which  has  been  steadily  growing  in  line  with  social  protection 
expenditures. Consumption and corporate taxes differ widely in the EU, and so do 
taxes · on  interest  income,  in  particular  withholding  taxes,  resulting  .  in 
discriminatory treatment in favour of non-residents. 
o  During  the  budgetary  retrenchment  of the  1990s,  Member  States  opted  for 
discretionary  expenditure-based  retrenchments,· and  five  countries  (Denmark, 
Germany,  Spain,  In~land, and The Netherlands) simultaneously reduced the tax 
burden between 1993/94 and 1997. In a number of countries, public investment 
bore a disproportionate share of spending cuts. Some of this reduction was due to 
sales of  capital assets and to a shift towards the private financing and operation of 
public infrastructure investments. 
23 These stylised facts suggest the following: 
1.  High taxes  hamper economic  efficiency,  growth  and,  eventually, job creation. 
High labour taxes are particularly harmful at the low end of  the wage scale where 
they lead to disincentives to create· and take up jobs, and increase "black market" 
activities. 
2.  As suggested by the BEPGs, the tax pressure, overall  and especially on labour, 
should be reduced in the EU. Hqwever, within the EU, large differences in the size 
of the  public  sector  and  the  tax  burden  persist.  This  would  imply:  first,  that 
general tax reductions  would not seem to  be  equally called  for  in  all  Member 
States; and, second, that given the need to maintain fiscal discipline, a reduction in 
the overall tax burden requires cuts in spending. To the extent that governments 
manage to broaden the tax bases and increase the efficiency of tax systems, tax 
rates could be reduced while maintaining current tax revenues and expenditures. 
3.  The insurance principle makes the link between the size of the Welfare State and 
the  tax  burden  particularly  close  in  the  majority  of EU  countries.  Therefore, 
reducing the tax burden on labour requires reducing expenditures, for  instance, 
through welfare reforms, and/or the shift of  taxation onto other tax bases. This has 
been  initiated  by  some  Member  States.  Nevertheless,  the  pressures  on  social 
spending coming from the ageing of the population and the need to  improve the 
functioning of the Welfare State  i~ relation of the labour market (cfr. Chapter 3) 
often necessitate reforms of  welfare spending. 
4.  Whilst  a  certain  degree  of competition  between  fiscal  systems  is  natural  and 
helpful, some tax co-ordination within the EU is necessary to avoid harmful tax 
competition. Such harmful competition can distort the functioning of the Single 
Market and  may further  increase the  tax  burden on the  less  mobile  tax  bases, 
namely labour, thereby aggravating the unemployment problem. 
5.  The composition of fiscal adjustments is important not only for the durability of 
budgetary discipline,, but also for growth and employment. Indeed, the significant 
reduction in structural unemployment in the 1990s in Denmark, the Netherlands, 
Ireland and the UK14 went hand in hand with a fiscal adjustment package based on 
reductions in tax burdens and discretionary cuts in spending, though, in line with 
conclusions  of the . Council  in  Vienna,  they  preserved  the  levels  of public 
investment. 
4.1 Social protection expenditure and  population ageing 
Social  protection  systems  in  Europe  play  a  fundamental  role  in  ensuring  income 
redistribution and social cohesion. However, due to deri10graphic and other structural 
changes, today's societies and economies are radically different from those at the time 
. 14  The UK, however cannot be judged according to the same parameters as used for continental EU 
countries. In fact, unlike the rest of  the EU, the tax burden had decreased significantly during the 
1980s and public investment dropped mainly due to outsourcing and other management choices. 
24 at  which  modern  welfare  states  were  established.  Particularly,  health  care  and 
pensions, which represent two thirds of expenditures on social protection in the EU 
(see  table  4.3  in  the  statistical  annex),  will  bear  much  of the  pressure  driven  by 
population  ageing.  Increasing  awareness  of these  problems,  as  well  as·  external 
pressure to re-establish budgetary discipline, has led to reforms. 
This change is quite evident for pension systems. Since the mid-eighties most pension 
schemes have been reformed  in  order to  be  able  to· handle  the  increasing  old-age 
burden  and  to  become  financially  sustainable.  Major reforms  were  introduced  in 
Austria, Germany, Italy, France, Greece, Portugal, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 
Reforms involve less generous benefit indexation rules, initiatives aimed at increasing 
real retirement ages, reductions in replacement rates, tightening of eligibility criteria 
for disability benefits and pension credits for years with limited or zero contributions, 
curtailing  or abolishing  public  sector  employees'  special  pension  benefits,  and/or 
lengthening  of contribution  periods  required  for  pension  eligibility.  A  number of 
European  coilntries,  such  as,  for  instance,  Denmark,  The  Netherlands,  Sweden, 
Finland  or  the  UK,  are  operating  supplementary  funded  pensiOns  on  a 
mandatory/contractmd  basis.  In  other  Member  States,  albeit  less  developed~ 
supplementary funding of  pensions is being introduced. 
In  several countries, reforms, by cutting eligibility and transfer ratios 15, have brought 
the expected increases in  the ratio of pension expenditure to  GOP firmly  below the 
expected increases of the old-age dependency ratio. Cost containment was just one of 
the objectives of the reforms, which also aimed at making the system more able to 
cope with demographic change, more transparent in its distributive effects, and less 
distortionary in its effects on individuals' choicesi6. 
Health  care  systems are  also  undergoing  substantial  changes,  although the  general · 
pattern of  reform is less uniform. This is due to substantial differences in the structure 
of national health care systems and the role of the public sector in the provision and 
financing of  health care. While maintaining the principles of universality and equality 
in the access to services, expenditure control has been pursued with a wide variety of 
instruments:  tighter  hospital  budgets,  restrictions  on  the  supply  of services  (i.e., 
hospital beds, new entrants in medical education, new technologies), restrictions on 
the  reimbursement  of drugs  (with  negative  and  positive  lists  and  reference  price 
systems), increase in cost-sharing: Several reforms aimed  at increasing efficiency in 
the  use of resources and  quality of services by  modifying  incentives  at  the  micro-
level:  giving  patients  more  choice  (Sweden),  introducing  competition  within  the 
public  sector and  between  the  public  and  the  private  sector  (UK),  separating  the 
provision  and  the  financing  of services  (UK),  relying  more  on  contracts  as  an 
instrument to  allocate  resources  among  providers,  shifting  responsibilities  towards 
regional and local administrative levels (Finland, Italy). 
I 5 Respectively, the ratio of  the number of  pensioners to the number of  elderly citizens and the ratio of 
the average pension to the average wage. 
16  This applies particularly to the recent Italian  ~nd Swedish pension refonns,  which share the same 
general objectives and main features. 
25 While some reforms have improved the incentive structure in the pension and health 
area, demographic pressure, all other things being equal, might push expenditures on 
social protection up by 6 to 7 percentage points of  the GOP until the year 203017. 
Further  reforms  would  therefore  be  needed  even  if  a  significant  increase  in 
employment were to alleviate the pressure. Measures have been proposed to raise the 
retirement age,  to  reinforce the  insurance aspect of the  system,  by closely linking 
pensions and contributions, as well as to, at least, complement pay-as-you-go systems 
with funded  schemes.  It  is  important to  assess the  elements of reform  which  may 
ensure  the  sustainability  of public  pension  schemes  while  preserving  their  basic 
aspects of solidarity. Budgetary pressure on health care systems may be alleviated, 
while guaranteeing universality and preserving their quality, by  taking advantage of 
the potentially beneficial effects of market mechanisms on efficiency, and by making 
consumers more aware of the costs of the services, which would encourage them to 
restrain their demand. 
4.2 Towards efficient and employment-friendly taxation 
Tax reforms 
Tax systems have an important impact on growth and employment. At the same time, 
they  should  generate  sufficient  revenue  for  the  financing  of public  expenditure, 
notably deriving from welfare and social provisions. Hence tax systems have to aim at 
balancing  economic  efficiency  and  social  cohesion,  whilst  contributing  to 
maintenance of  budgetary discipline which is at the core of  EMU. 
As in the case of public expenditure, several countries have implemented important 
tax reforms in the past several years. In general, such reforms aim at simplifying the 
tax  system,  broadening  the  tax  base,  reducing  taxes  on  labour  and  reducing  the 
shadow economy. Sweden, Denmark, Spain, Italy, Portugal and The Netherlands have 
introduced fundamental reforms in their tax system along these lines. 
EU tax co-ordination 
Although  some  degree  of tax  competition  is  desirable  in  order  to  enhance  the 
efficiency of  tax systems, harmful tax competition is.a cause for concern, since it may 
lead  to  fiscal  degradation  through  the  erosion  of mobile  tax  bases,  which  are 
transferred to  low-tax countries, and the increase of "black market" activities.  This 
could significantly reduce fiscal revenues, thereby leading to a sub-optimal provision 
of public goods or force  a further  rise  in  the tax  burden on  less mobile bases  like 
labour, which would hamper employment. 
As  stressed  in  the  Cardiff I  report,  the  persistence  of incompatibilities  between 
national  tax  systems  in  some  areas  and  of harmful  tax  competition  gives  rise  to 
17 According to a Commission study (European Economy- Reports and Studies, 311996), pensions arc 
expected to grow by 3 to  4 percentage points of GOP by 2030.  The study shows that, under the 
assumption of  no further reforms compared to the 1996 institutional setting, pensions could amount 
to 15-20% of  the GOP in Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Austria and Luxembourg, and 
to 10-15% in Denmark, Spain, and Sweden. Only in  Ireland, the UK.and Portugal expenditures on 
pensions could remain below 10% of  the GOP in 30 years time. 
26 obstacles to trade, and may contribute to the segmentation of  the Single Market, hence 
to a sub-optimal allocation of resources. EU tax policy is better described in terms of 
tax co-ordination rather than outright tax  harmonisation.  There are  certain areas of 
taxation which require  a  high  degree of harmonisation,  indirect taxation  being the 
most prominent example.  Value-add~d tax and excise duties may directly affect the 
functioning of  the Single Market. Differences as regards the tax bases, as well as the 
application of normal and  reduced VAT rates,  result in  implicit tax rates that vary 
between 12% ih Spain and 21.2% in Denmark (see table 3.3  in the statistical annex). 
Although consumption is  not highly mobile, cross border sales may be significantly 
distorted by differences in VAT rates.  · 
Taxation of corporate income and the  interest on  savings are areas where a certain 
degree of  co~ordination is important and desirable. Corporate taxation across the EU 
seems to be dominated by a wide array of exemptions and deductions which directly 
affect the tax bases. Consequently, the differences  in terms of effective taxation of 
corporate  income  across  Member  States  are  larger  than  the  differences  between · 
statutory  rates. Also comparisons of the  interest  withholding  tax  rates  show large 
differences within the EU (table 4.4). The statutory rates for local creditors range from 
0  to  40%,  while,  for  foreign  creditors,  the  range  goes  from  0  to  only  25%.  Such 
differences  in  taxation across Member States could  lead  to  incf1icicnt  allocation of 
financial and physical capital. The Code ofConducl and the new Council Directive to 
ensure a  minimum of effective taxation of savings  income  in the  form  of interest 
payments within the Community, as well as the agreement on the need to eliminate 
withholding  taxes  on -payments  of interest  and  royalties.  between  associated 
companies, should be regarded as a package of  measures to fight against harmful tax 
competition,  and  the  first  concrete  result  of a  comprehensive  and  co-ordinated 
approach to tax policies at the Union level.  . 
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'\; Table 1.1:  Member State share of intra-EU FDI inflows and their importanc.'1 
to GDP, 1992-97  - . , 
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0.8% 1.2 :  Cross-border mergers and acquisitions involving EU firms. 
Percentage shares of each Member State, compared to shares of 
·EU GDP, 1995~1998 
Member State  Target*  Bidder**  ~DP  as %  of.EU total 
·(acquired company)  (acquirer)  . (1996) 
0/o  % 
Belgium  '4.4  3.3  3.1 
Denmark  . 3.2  4.7  2.0 
Germany  20.8  14.3  27.4 
Greece  0.4  0.2  1.4 
Spain  5.6  1.7  6.8 
France  14.4  14.6  17.8 
Ireland  1.3  3.3  0.8 
Italy  . 7.5  3.2  14.1 
Luxembourg  0.6  1.0  0.2 
Netherlands  7.2  12.4  4.6 
Austria  2.2  1.6  2.7 
Portugal  1.1·  0.4  1.3 
Finland  3.8  3.1  1.5 
Sweden  4.9  8.1  2.9 
United Kingdom  22.6  28.4  13.4 
EU  tpo  100  100 
Sources: Acquisitions Monthly and Eurostat 
*  Takeovers of  EU firms, by firms of  another Member State or non-EU firms, classified by nationality 
. of  the acquired company. 
** Takeovers by EU firms, of  firms in another Member State or outside the EU, classified by.n1;1tionality of 
the acquiring company. 
Table 1.3: 1996 price level indices and standards of living. 
30 Graph 1.1: · . Small Member States:  trade integration within the EU relative to small 
··  Member State average,  1992~97 (the difference ·between each individual · 
·. small Member State's  intra-EU trade  to  GDP  ratio  and ·the  weighted 
. averageintra-EU trade to GDP ratio for small Member States)·  · 
Source:  Eurostat and Commission services 
Graph L2 : Large Member States:  trade integration within the EU relative to large 
Member State average, 1992:.97  (the difference· between each individual 
large  Member State's  intra~EU trade  to  GDP  ratio  and the  weighted 
average intra-EU trade to GDP ratio for large Member States) 
1.5% 
1.0% 
0.5% 
0 ;0% 
-0.5% 
-1 .0% 
-1 .5% 
-2.0% 
-2.5% 
-3.0% 
.  .  .  . 
Source:  Eurqstat and Commission services. Note that the scale of  this figure is different from that of  Figure 1.1 
31 Table 1.4: EU productivity and price d~spersion in manufacturing sectors (1996) 
Source: Eurostat, Commission services  .  . 
The 'EU' c;olumn shows sectoral productivity levels ir{ index form relative to the EU's average manufacturing 
productivity level (=:'100);  the ".USA" column does the same for the USA.  The "EUIUSA" column divides the EU's 
relative productivity levels by those of  the USA - the result indicates in which sectors the EU is relatively more 
productive than the USA.  The final column simply provides a measure of  price dispersion around the·EU. 
'  . 
.  ; 
Table 1.5: Relative performance of the El.J vis a  vis the US and Jap.an 
-
1996  EUlS  us 
. Standard of  living*  100  148 
., 
Apparent labour  100  126 
productivity** 
.. 
• GOP per head at .1990 !llarket prices in purchasing power parities (PPPs). EU 15=;100 
•• GOP per person employed at 1990 market prices in PPPs. RU.15=100 
Source: AMECO, DG II 
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JAPAN 
118. 
89 'll'A.BlLlE J.ll 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy. 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Austria 
Portugal 
Finland 
Sweden 
United Kingdom 
EURO-Zone 
EU-15 
USA 
JAPAN 
UNEMPLOYMENT 
IRATE OF TOTAL 
!LABOUR FORCE 
(1) 
9.2 
5.5 
10.0 
9.6 
20.8 
12.4 
10.1 
12.1 
2.6. 
5.2 
4.4 
6.8 
13.1 
9.9 
7.0 
11.6 
10.7 
4.9 
3.4 
(I) Harmonised unemployment rates, EUROSTAT 
SHARE OF 
LONG-TERM 
lJNEMPLOYED 
.  AMONGALIL 
UNEMPLOYED 
·  (  ~IZ  MONTHS) 
(2) 
60.5 
27.2 
50.1 
55.7 
51.8 
39.6 
57.0 
66.3 
34.6 
49.1 
28.7 
55.6 
29.8 
34.2 
38.6 
50.9 
49.0 
8.7 
21.8 
UNEMPLOYMENT 
RATJEOFTHOSE 
WHTIHI !LOW 
IEDUCA. TIONAL 
.  '  LEVElL 
(3) 
13.4 
14.6 
13.3 
6.3 
.·  20.6 
14.0 
16.4 
9.1 
3.8 
7.9 
5.7 
6.2 
21.6 
10.1 
12.2 
N.A. 
13.7 
10.0 
N.A. 
(2) Labour Force Survey, EUROSTAT. For USA and Japan, OECD Employment Outlook  1998  ·· 
SHARE OF 
UNEMIPLOVlED 
WITH LOW 
EDUCATIONAL 
LEVEL AMONG· 
TOTAL 
UNEMPLOYED  . 
(41) 
50.2 
37.3 
26.5 
37.3 
62.6 
45.1 
63.7 
55.6 
71.5 
49.4 
34.7 
76.6 
38.2 
31.9 
55.0 
47.0 
47.2 
.N.A. 
N.A. 
(3) Educational level lower than upper secondary; persons aged 25 to 64 years-old (1995), OECD Employment Orlllook  1998. 
(4) Educational level lower than upper secondary (lower secondary and less);  persons aged 25-59 (1997 2Q), LFS, EUROSTAT. 
(5) Labour Force Survey, EUROSTAT For USA and Japan, OECD Employment Outlook  1998  . 
Source: LFS, EUROSTAT; OECD Employment Outlook 1998. 
UNEMPLOYMENT 
IRATE FOR YOUTH 
(15-24) 
(5) 
21.3 
8. I 
10.7 
31.0 
39.2 
29.0 
15.9 
33.6 
7.3 
9.7 
7.6 
14.1 
35.4 
21.9 
13.6 
23.5 
21.2 
11.3 
6.6 Ell!tll~lli{J)ymmenn~  1Unn<ell!tll~lli{J)yll!tlleunll: 
Connnn~Iry 
1I'o~mll  Menn 25-54!  'JI'o~anll  Menn 25-54! 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (<a) 
Annstirna  70.0  93.7  4.4  4.5 
lBellgfinnm  57.3  86.6  9.2  6.2 
IDeunmanirlk  77.5  90.5  5.5  4.1 
lFfinnllamll  63.9  80.7  13.1  12.3 
JF'Iraunce  60.1  86.5  12.4  9.6 
Genrnauny  61.8  82.4  10.0  8.2 
Gireece  56.8  90.1  9.6  4.9 
liir<ellamll  57.9  82.5  10.1  9.5 
litany  51.3  83.1  12.1  7.5-
lLnnxemlbonnirg  58.8·  92.5  2.6  1.5 
.N etDnerllamlls  66.7  89.5  5.2  3.6 
lP'oranngall  67.6  88.4  6.8  5.0 
Spa  nun  48.6  80.1  20.8  13.9 
§wed! en  69.5  81.8  9.9  9.6 
UK  70.8  85S  7.0  6.7 
EUlS  60.5  84.5  10.7  8.1 
United States  74.0  88.4  4.9  3.7 
Japan  74.7  95.3  3.4  2.5 
Source: (I) &  (2)  Employment rates report, European Commission~· (3) Harmonised unemployment rates, EUROSTAT; 
(4) EUROSTAT: US and Japan OECD Employment Outlook: June 1998. 
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Grapll:n 3.1  Regional unemployment rates in Member· States, 1997 
(minimum, average and maximum in o/o) 
------------------------------------------------
35~--------~------------------------------------~ 
30 --
20 
Hainaut 
-- - - Sachsen~ 
Anhalt 
Sur 
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Mooiterranee 
15  _  ......... ·  ............................... """'·I······  .. . 
_  . 0  Brabant 
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B  DK_D  EL  E·  F  JRL·I 
Source: EUROSTAT, Regio database 
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L  NL  AT  P- SF  S  UK 
.  Note: NUTS 1 regions except forB, NL, AT, P, SF, S (NUTS 2), DK, IRL (NUTS 3); L (national) 
35 TABLE3.3  IMPLICIT TAX RATES ON LABOUR AND CAPITAL(%) 
.  .  (1996)  .. 
IMPLICIT TAX  TAXES ON  IMPLICIT TAX  TOTAL TAX  BMPLICHTAX 
RATE ON  LOW- SKILLED  RATE ON  WEDGE  RATE ON 
EMPLOYED  WORKERS  CONSUMPTION  OTHER 
LABOUR  FACTORS 
(I)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Belgium  44.8  50.5  13.7  48.2  38.6 
Denmark  47.1  41.3  21.2  54.2  35.8 
Germany  43.3  46.5  13.7  45.6  36.1 
Greece  44.9  34.9.  16.6  34.5  9.7 
Spain  38.3  34.4  12.3  37.4  24.0 
France  44.9  44.3  14.6  51.1  47.6 
Ireland  29.1  26.5  18.9  36.6  21.4 
Italy  50.1  48.3  13.4  45.4  33.1 
Luxembourg  30.2  29.1  17.9  44.8  49.8 
Netherlands  46.7  39.3  15.4  48.4  37.0 
Portugal  42.0  30.6  15.9  34.2  18.0 
UK  27.3  26.8  14.6  33.1  36.8 
Austria  45.8  37.4  15.6  49.9  38.9 
Finland  55.3  45.3  19.0  55.6  24.1 
Sweden  57.6  48.6  16.1  56.3  47.4 
EURO-Zone*  44.8  44.2  14.1  46.4  35.6 
EU-15  42.6  41.8  14.4  44.8  35.6 
USA  23.2  29.2  5.5  27.9  45.3 
Japan  24.7  18.4  5.1  27.1  52.3 
· •  EURO-Zone includes 11  countries:  Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Austria 
and Finland. 
(1) The ratio of  taxes directly borne by the employed labour to the total compensation of  employees. Employed labour taxes include: 
social security contributions paid the employers and the employees, the taxes on payroll and workforce, and personal income tax on 
employed labour.  · 
(2) Tax benefit of  singles with no children (wage level 67% of APW). Employees' and employers' SSC and personal income tax less 
transfer payments (% of  gross labour costs: gross wage earnings plus employer's SSC). 
(3) The ratio of  consumption taxes to the after-tax value of  consumption 
(4) The tax wedge includes all taxes borne by labour (social security contributions and personal taxes on labour income) plus the part 
of consumption taxes  paid  when  spending  labour income.  The tax  wedge  is  the  difTcrcnce  between  the  producer wage and  the 
consumer wage as a percentage of the former.  · 
(5) Social security contributions and other taxes paid by the self-employed, plus taxes on capital income expressed as a percentage of 
the capital income (total operating surplus). 
Source: EUROSTAT and DG XXI (Structures of  taxation systems in the EU), DG II,  OECD The  Tax/Benefit position of  employees, 
1997. 
36 Table 3.4  .  Net Replacement Rates of  Unemployment Benefits in 1995 
-'  .. 
NET. REPLACEMENT RATES 
: ...  ;:; 
, .  ' 
.  .  .  . 
.  2/3-ofAPW- APW 
COUNTRY 
.. 
:  .  .  . 
1"
1 month  60
1
b  month.  1"' month  60
1
b  month 
Belgium  79  - 86  61  58 
Denmark  93  82  70  74 
Germany.  74  85  72  66 
Greece')  N.A.  N.A.  57  N.A.' 
Spain  72  49  74  35. 
France  86  57  76  46 
Ireland  60  60  49  49 
Italy  41  7'  42  5 
Luxembourg  87  84  87·  66 
Netherlands  87  92  79  71 
Austria  65  62  63  61 
Portugal  88  3  78  2 
Finland  87  95  75  81 
Sweden  80  109  78  82 
UK  81  85  61  64 
Note: The summary measures of net replacement rates and tax rates have been calculated as a simple average of the rates for three 
family types (single person,  couple without children and  couple with two children. The net replacement rate for the  60th  month of 
unemployment includes the possible topping-up of  social assistance but the I" month's rate not.  · 
')The Greek net replacement rate is from the study of  the Central Planning Bureau for 1993. 
'  Source: OECD 1998, Benefit Systems and work Incentives 
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'JI'ABLE4.1  STRUCTuREs· OF clJRR::ENT EXPE:NDrrl1REs i:~rTHE  :EU. (%  GDP) · 
.  .  ·"  (1998)  . 
:·-.  ..  ., 
I 
TOTAL  I  PUBLIC  TOTAL  CURRENT  PUBLIC 
EXPENDITURE  I  INVESTMENT  CURRENT  TRANSFERS TO  CONSlJ M PTION  I 
I  EXPENDITURES  HOUSEHOLDS 
(1)  I  (l)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
' 
Belgium  51.1  ' 
1.5  4~.0  24.0  14.0 
Denmark  57.6  t  1.6  55.9  19.2  26.8 
Germany  47.5  :  1.8  44.7  18.8  19.2 
Greece  41.5  I  3.6  39.8  15.6  14.5 
Spain  42.9  !  3.0  39.2  15.0  15.8 
France  54.1  !  2.8  51.1  23.4  19.3 
Ireland  31.6  i  2.5  29.6  12.1  .  12.4 
Italy  49.9  i  2.3  46.6  20.0  16.2 
Luxembourg  44.5  i  5.0  39.5  23.4  13.1 
Netherlands  48.3  :  2.5  45.9  24.1  14.1 
Portugal  42.8  t  4.1  39.4  .  16.6  18.6 
UK  41.3  !  1.2  39.8  .  16.3  18.5 
Austria  51.5  8  2.0  47.9.  21.2  18.9 
Finland  52.2  8  2.7  49.7  19.9  20.6 
Sweden  61.8  u  2.5  60.2  21.8  25.8 
lEUR O-Zone*  49.1  0  2.3  46.1  .  20.2  17.8 
lEU-15  48.2  ~  2.1  45.6  ..  19.5  18.2 
USA  34.1  I  1.6  33.2  13.7  15.3 
Japan  38.6  I  6.4  30.4  15.7  10.0 
*  EURO-Zone includes II countries:  Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, PortugaL Austria 
and Finland. 
(I) Nominal total expenditure as a percentage of  gross domestic product at market prices (includes (2) and (3)) 
(2) Gross fiXed capital formation as a percentage of gross domestic product at market prices (included in (I)) 
(3) Total current expenditure as a percentage of  gross domestic product at market prices (included. in (I) and including (4) &  (5)) 
(4) Current transfers to households as a percentage of  gross domestic product at market prices (included in (3)) 
(5) Government consumption (national DEFs) as a percentage of  gross domestic product at market prices (included in (3)) 
Source: AMECO 
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TABLE4~2 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
UK 
Austria 
Finland 
Sweden 
EURO-Zone* 
EU-15 
USA 
Japan 
;  ,·.  .  .  ·- ,.  ~· 
TiiE·STRUCTl'JRE QF.THKTA.X:·~~)!:~:·(6 (o GDP) · 
. .  . .  .•.  ·...  .  .  (1998)·.·..  >;>;:,; ;'  . 
TOTAL 
CURRENT 
RECEIPTS 
(1) 
49.7 
58.8 
44.8 
39.0 
40.8 
51.3 
33.7 
47.2 
46.8 
47.0 
40.4 
41.4 
49.3 
52.9 
62.7 
46.7 
46.4 
35.4 
33.0 
I 
I  TAXBURDEN  I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
! 
1. 
i 
i 
! 
i 
i 
! 
i 
l 
(2) 
48.3 
52.4 
42.2 
34.8 
36.9 
32.3 
42.9 
42.5 
44.2 
36.5 
38.6 
46.5 
46.5 
54.3 
43.4 
43.0 
31.5 
28.9 
"'·.·~~·-,  ·,.. . 
.. :·•:·'··: ..... ,.;:·  .. 
·soCIAL 
SECURITY 
CONTRIBUTIONS 
(3) 
17.1 
2.7 
19.6 
12.6 
13.9 
19.3 
4.0 
12.7 
11.5 
18.1 
11.8 
7.7 
17.0 
13.4 
15.3 
17.0 
15.1 
9.4 
11.1 
DIRECT 
TAXES 
(4) 
18.4 
30.7 
10.0 
8.0 
11.5 
12.6 
14.0 
14.6 
14.0 
12.6 
10.5 
16.7 
13.7 
18.7 
22.7 
12.4 
13.7 
15.1 
9.5 
·.·  .·i. 
INDIRECT 
TAXES 
(5) 
12.9 
18.9 
12.6 
14.2 
11.4 
15.7 
14.3 
15.5 
17.0 
13.6 
14.2 
14.2 
15.8 
14.5 
16.3 
14.0 
14.2 
7.0 
8.4 
•  EURO-Zone includes 11  countries:  Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Austria 
and Finland. 
(1) Total current receipts as a percentage of  gross domestic product at market prices (includes (2)) 
(2) Tax burden as a percentage of  gross domestic product at market prices (includes (3), (  4) and (5)) 
(3) Social security contributions as a percentage· of gross domestic product at market prices (included in (2)) 
(  4) Current taxes on income and wealth as a percentage of  gross domestic product at market prices (included in (2)) 
{5) Taxes linked to imports and production as a percentage of  gross domestic product at market prices (included in (2)) 
·  Source: AMECO. 
39 'JI'ABLE ~.3  THE STRPGT~:()]l?.SOCIAL  PiUlTECTIO~  JN :rHE EU (% GDP) 
':·  ,, 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
llreland 
Ualy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
llllK 
Austria 
Finland 
Sweden 
lEUJRO-Zone* 
lElU-15 
USA 
Jfapan 
'  ;  .  ·:,,::::·  '.'•:'  ..  : (1993-19,6)  ·.  '  .,·  ·- ' 
i 
EXPENDITURES  I 
ONSOCIAL  I 
PROTECTION  I 
<•>  I 
I 
27.4 
33.3 
28.3 
19.6 
21.9 
29.1 
19.1  i 
24.1 
24.2 
30.6 
18.5 
27.0 
28.5 
32.9 
36.1 
27.1 
27.4 
N.A. 
N.A. 
PENSIONS 
(2) 
8.6 
12.6 
11.3 
8.3 
8.7 
10.6 
4.0 
12.9 
7.4 
9.8 
6.3 
9.2 
10.8 
9.4 
12.6 
10.8 
10.7 
N.A. 
N.A. 
HEALTH  UNEMPLOYMENT 
(3)  (4) 
7.1  3.9 
6.0  5.3 
8.6  2.8 
5.2  1.0 
6.4  3.6 
8.4  2.5 
6.6  3.3 
5.4  0.5 
6.0  0.7 
8.9  3.0 
6.2  1.0 
6.9  1.8 
7.3  1.6 
7.0  4.9 
7.9  4.0 
7.6  2.4 
7.4  2.4 
N.A.  N.A. 
N.A.  N.A. 
. '  ... 
! 
i;''·,, 
INVALIDITY 
(5) 
1.8 
3.4 
2.0 
1.7 
1.7 
1.7 
0.9 
1.8 
3.2 
4.7 
2.5 
3.1 
2.2 
4.9 
4.2 
2.1 
2.3 
N.A. 
N.A. 
~  EURO-Zone includes II countries:  Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netlu~rlands, Portugal, Austria 
and Finland. 
(I) General government spending on social protection measures as a percentage of  GDP at market prices (includes (2), (3), (  4) & (5)) 
(2) General government spending on pensions as a percentage ofGDP at market prices (included in (I)) 
(3) General government spending on health as a percentage ofGDP at market prices (included in (I)) 
(4) General government spending on unemployment as a percentage ofGDP at market prices (included in (I)) 
(5) General government spending on invalidity as a percentagc·ofGDP at market prices (included in (I)) 
Source: ESSPROS. 
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TABLK4A  . CORPORATE ANp,~TJt!U:ST  TAXES (l~~~), . 
STATUTORY 
',  WITHHOLDING  WITHHOLDING 
CORPORATE TAX  TAX ON INTEREST  TAX ON INTEREST 
RATES  (RESIDENTS)  (NON-RESIDENTS) 
Belgium  39  15  15 
Denmark  34  0  0 
Germany  30-45  30-35  0 
Greece  35-40  20  40 
Spain  25-35  25  25 
France  33.33  0  0 
Ireland  25-32  24  24 
Italy  37  27  0 
Luxembourg  20-30  0  0 
Netherlands  35-36  0  0 
Portugal  34  15-20  20 
UK  31  20  N.A. 
Austria  34  20  0 
Finland  28  0-28  0 
Sweden  28  0  0 
EURO-Zone*  N.A.  N.A.  N.A. 
EU-15  N.A.  N.A.  N.A. 
USA  15-35  0  N.A. 
Japan  27-37.5  N.A.  15-20 
•  EURO-Zone includes 11  countries:  Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Irelan~, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Austria and Finland.·. 
Notes on statutory corporn.tc taxes and withholding taxes on inlcrcst: 
BELGIUM: The standard corporate tax rate is  ]9"1.. If less Lhan  BEF 13  million, 2s•;. to 41%. 
FINLAND: 00./i withholding tax paid to non-resident or resident companies; 28~o paid to resident indjviduals. 
FRANCE: The effective corporate jncome tax rate, including the J{f'/o surtax, is 36,66%. From 1~7.  the corporate income tax rate for SME's Lhat capltalis.e tax results is  190"/c (25% of profits). From 
1997-2000, companies exceeding FF 50 million turnover pay an  additional  IS% surtax (effective 41,66%). Thls will be progress~vely phase out in 2000.  · 
GERMANY: 45% for resldent companies' undistnbuted profits and JOO/o for distributed profits (branches of  foreign oomp.antes- pay 4:ZO/~~o). Local taxes can  increase the total 50% {generous allowances 
make effective rates much lower. Withholding lB'<  is  30"/c on lnteresl paid by domestic banks or 35,.... (over-the-counter trade, wh.kh can be refunded) a oolidarity .surcharge of 5,5% put rates at 11,65% 
and 17,625% respectively.  · 
GREECE: Corporate tax is 3 S% f9r listed non-financial companies and 400/a  for the rest. Jnterest on ]oa.J15,  is  subject to a 40% withholding ta",  ~f paid to a non-resident, and 20%a,  If paid to a resident 
company. UJans granted by foreign banks and industrial firms to Greek companies are exempt from tax on interest.  · 
IRELAND: The standard rate is 32% but the first IP 50,000 of a company's taxable ancome is  .subject to a 25% rate.  Income tax of 24% is  withheld on interest payments to both  l-ocal  and foreign 
creditors made after April 1997; however, tax treatjes reduce the withholding tax to zero for most of  the countries. 
ITALY·. Corporations are taxed at 3?0/o but from  1998, a lower rate appJies for non-distributed profits. A new regionaJ tax of  4-511J. on business value added (TRAP} ls being introduced.'Withholdlng tax 
js 27% on jnterest from bank accounts. From July 1998, non-residents arc exempt from withholding tax. 
LUXEMBOURG: Rates for corporate income tax vary from 20"!. to J()Qio,  depending on the income levet There are also a 4% tax surcha1ge for an unemployed fund and a municipal business tax_ of 
9,1•!. ILS an average. Favourable investment allowances and tax holidays for new investor1 reduce the effective tax burden.  · 
NETifERLANDS. The corporate income tax is 3 S% (together with local taxes). For companies with profits of  up to NLG I 00,000 the rate is  36%. 
PORTUGAL: TI;e gencr~l rate in many municipalities put the effective corporate tax in  17,4% (local surcharges of 100/o of the base tax).  Withholding tax is between 15% (on interest from ordinary 
loans and credit facilities} and of20%, (on interest from bank deposits a.nd  all bonds). For no residents is 2QD/o fr-om  non-exempt bonds and other interest payments 
SPAIN: 25% for  non-resident corporations (capital  gains nre  taxed  at  35%) and 35% for resident corporations. If the creditor is a  resident in  a EU country that is  not on Spain's tax·haven list the 
withholding tax is zero (only Luxembourg is included in  this list). 
UNITED KINGDOM: Corporation tax for companies with profits under GBP 300,000 is  25% for"the yenrs ending March 31st 1997, 21% for the two years ending March 31st 1999 and 2<1%  from 
April  lst 1999. Interest payments to non-residents may be subject to reduced or icro withholding tax under tax treaties.  · 
UNITED STATES: Companies pay  15% on the first USS 50,000 oftuable income, 25% on the next US$ 25,000, 34% on the ne:'tt USS 9,925,000 and 35% on the reniainder;plu.s a :S% surcharge on 
income between US$ 100,000 and USS 335,000, and a 3% surcharge on income between US$ I 5 million and US$ 18,313,333. There is no withholding tax on interest paid to US companies and other 
remittances are governed by me treaties. 
JAPAN: Corporate rates go from 2?0/o to 37,5% There is  a regional tal(  and a municipa1 tax of 5'Y. and  12,3% respectively, and an enterprise tax of 12o/. on profits  The withholding tax on interest to 
non-res.ldents is  15o/o (200!. for interest on loans). 
Source: E. I. U Country Tax Regulations. 
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Price dispersion 
At the  most aggregate  level  (including  both private  and public  consumption as  well  as  capital 
investments),  EU  price  dispersion  has  come  down  from  20.1%  in  198518  to  16.3%  in  1996. 
However, figures  at this leyel of aggregation do not necessarily reflect developments in specific  ~ 
markets (see Table A.3.1).  · 
The  3.8%  decline  in  GDP  price  dispersion  since  1985  results  from  a  6.0%  decline  in  price 
dispersion  for  private  consumption,  which  was  offset  by  a  1.8%  -rise  in  price  dispersion  for 
government consumption (reflecting rising wage difference between Member States) and 0.7% rise 
for capital investments. This seems to imply that market integration has concentrated in markets for 
consumer products, and that other markets (including public procurement) have been less affected. 
There  is  evidence that  import  penetration ratios  for  public  procurement  sectors  in  the  Member 
States are consistently lower than penetration ratios in the non-public sphere19.  Nevertheless, with a 
price dispersion of 13.5% capital good markets remain  more integrated than market for consumer 
goods (15.9%). The former figure actually reflects a relatively high price dispersion in construction 
(22.0%)  and  a  low  price  dispersion  for  machinery  and  equipment  (7.7%).  The  Single  Market 
Review2o  had already identified the construction sector as  one of the  least  integrated economic 
sectors, also because trade intensity in the sector is relatively low. Nevertheless, the degree of price 
dispersion in construction has come down from its 1993 high of23.6%. 
At the level of individual product headings even larger differences in price dispersion21  exist. Price 
dispersion tends to be high for small-item products like potatoes (42%), beer22 (41%), tea (34%), 
and flowers  and plants (32%), which have a relatively  low price elasticity of demand.  For other 
product headings, the high level of price dispersion reflects the prevalence of regulated prices in 
~--::·-~~·~;-cl::l1.a~n.-,.s~9Jprs:  services of general practitioners (  44%) and specialists (  43%  ),  natural  gas  (  41%  ), 
medicines  (34%).  In  general,  price  dispersion  in  services  is  larger  than  price  dispersion  in 
manufactured products, especially homogyneous items such as fruit juice and underwear, or large-
ticket items including washing machines, dishwashers and other household appliances (all 11 %). 
In order to assess the degree of dispersion of price levels between EU Member States, the price 
dispersion  in  a  large  integrated  market  like  the  United  States  would· be  the  ideal  benchmark. 
However, no comprehensive statistics exists that permit a comparison of prices between US regions 
or states. Nevertheless, the American Chamber of Commerce Researchers Association (ACCRA) 
collects information on relative prices levels in US cities for a select number of  consumer goods and 
services. A comparison of these data with information about EU prices at the basic heading level 
18  Sources OECD, Eurostat 
19  'Public procurement', Vol. 3, No 3, The Single Market Review (1996) 
20  "Economic evaluation of  the internal market", European Economy, N° 4,  1996. 
21  Aggregation tends to lead to a reduction in the coefficient of price variation. Caution should therefore be exercised 
when  comparing price  dispersion  at the aggregate  level  with  the  level  of price dispersion  for  specific  product 
headings. 
22  Substantial differences in  excise tax rates between Member States help explain tht:  relatively high  levels of price 
dispersion for alcoholic beverages and tobacco products. 
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) ( 
-we may therefore conclude that while the Single Market Pro-gramme has had an important effect on 
price dispersion, there is n~vertheless considerable scope for further price convergence. The greater 
degree of price transparency, lower transaction costs. and the elimination of exchange-rate risk in 
the Economic and Monetary Union should contribute to such a deyelopment. 
Table 2.1: Price dispersion in the EU 
Source: Eurostat, Commission services 
· Table 2.2: 1996 price-level indices (EUR15=100) 
Source: Eurostat, Commission services, OECD 
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Price-Cost Margins in Manufacturing 
Introduction 
Imperfect competition in the  goods  market will  in  general  lead to  welfare  losses.  Demand side 
losses arise because market imperfections allow firms to earn monopoly rents by charging prices to 
their customers which· are too high, given the marginal cost of producing the goods or services that 
are offered. Possession of  market power also puts less pressure on firms to choose the best available 
production method and  use  resources  efficiently.  This  leads  to  high production  costs  and  puts 
additional pressure on prices. Barriers to enter certain markets are a primary factor leading to  the 
appearance  of market  imperfections.  Therefore  one  important  objective  of the  single  market 
programme (SMP) consisted of increasing the degree of competition by removing administrative 
barriers such as, for example, technical standards and limited access to public procurement.  Jt  was 
estimated that this program \YOuld be likely to affect a sizeable fraction of  EU  industrics23. Thus, at 
least for some of the identified sectors one can expect a decline in price cost m_argins  and a more . 
efficient use of  resources in recent years. 
This appendix presents estimation results the evolution of price-cost margins in the manufacturing 
sector, looking especially at whether price cost margins have. declined in those sectors which should 
be most affected by the SMP. Of course the decline in mark-ups is not necessarily limited to those 
sectors. Other factors such as increased trade with emerging economies, for example, may also have 
affected the degree of  competition in recent years. In order to be able to better discriminate between 
a general reduction in monopoly rents and a reduction caused by the SMP, the mark-up estimates . 
. for EU countries/sectors, for which time series of sufficient quality are available, are compared to. 
the corresponding US industries. A previous OECD study24  finds that average mark-up estimates 
for US industries over the period 1970-92 are often at the lower end when compared to other OECD 
economies. The US results can therefore also serve as a benchmark for assessing the progress that 
has been made within the EU in recent years. 
In interpreting these results it must be pointed out that mark-up estimates do not necessarily provide 
completely  unambiguous  guidance  for  judging  the  performance  of an  industry  in  a  particular 
country. They must therefore be seen in relation to other indicators of sectoral perfonnance. There 
are two economic circumstances in particular which call for a cautious interpretation, namely, rent 
sharing and innovation rents. In the presence of rent sharing between workers anq firms, mark-ups 
will  generally  be  underestimated,  because  only  those  rents  which  accrue  to  the  company  are 
captured by the estimation procedure. Also, a decline/increase of mark-ups should not necessarily 
be interpreted as an improvement/decline in economic perfonnance of that particular sector.  An 
increase in mark-ups could be the consequence of producing higher quality products or some other 
technological advantage not matched by competitors which allows the corresponding sector to reap 
23 40 out of 120 industrial sectors were identified as being most affected by the internal market. 
24 See Oliveira Martins, J.; S. Scarpetta and D. Pilat {1997). Mark-up pricing, Market Structure and the Business Cycle. 
OECD Economic Studies, 27. 
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) an innovation rent. Conversely, a decline in mark-ups could indicate a lack of innovative <ictivity in 
a particular sector, increasing the exposure to foreign low cost competition. 
Box:  Methodology and Data 
The empirical analysis follows  closely .the  study conducted by the OECD, with the 
following modifications. First, the end of the estimation period is extended from  1992 . 
to  1995. Second, unlike in the earlier OECD study which was mostly concerned with 
the estimation of an average  mark-up  over the  entire. sample period (1970-92),  this 
study also looks whether statistically significant breaks in the level of mark-ups have 
occurred  in  1986  or after.  Finally,  in  order  not to  confuse  structural. breaks  from 
business cycle fluctuations, the estimates also control for the impact of sectoral output 
gaps on mark-ups. The reported results only give the trend change in mark-ups. 
The primary data sources are the OECD ISDB and STAN data bases.  ISDB provides 
time series information at the 2-digit level, while STAN gives data for selected 3-digit 
manufacturing industries. Unfortunately, data at the required detail are generally only 
available for the US, the four largest EU countries plus Belgium, Denmark and Sweden. 
The analysis proceeds as  follows.  First,  results  for 2-digit manufacturing sectors are 
given: In a second step, estimates at the 3-digit level for those sectors which have be·en 
· classified as being affected by the SMP are presented  .. 
Empirical Results: 
Table B. I presents r,egression results for the 2,..digit manufacturing industries in large and small EU 
countries and the US2S.  The following general picture emerges from these regressions. Price-cost 
margins in the large EU countries are generally estimated to be somewhat greater than in smaller 
EU economies and tl)ey also generally exceed those in the US, especially before 1986. ·within.  the 
large EU economies, mark-ups seem to be lowest in the UK. There exists a tendency for mark-ups 
to have fallen significantly in some industries in the larger EU economies, especially in basic metal 
industries and in manufacture of fabricated metal products, indicating that SMP has been effective. 
The effects are different across countries and not uniform across the 3-digit industries. The results 
in the table also indicate some convergence of  mark-ups within the EU 
The sectors manufacture of wood and wood products, paper, printing and publishing and  basic 
metal industries have been classified as being hardly affected by the SMP. Together, they currently 
employ about 19% of  all workers in the manufacturing sector in the seven EU countries. Generally 
no significant change in mark-ups occurred in these sectors; there are, however some exceptions. In 
the wood industry, a significant mark-up increase occurred in France and a decline in Sweden. In 
paper and publishing, a decline in mark-ups occurred in both West-Germany and Sweden. In basic 
metal industries a pronounced decline in price cost margins occurred in Italy anJ Germany, Italy 
used to have the highest mark-ups before 1986. 
25  Only significant changes up to the 10% level of  significance are reported. 
45 Within the food sector, the chemical industry and in the sector non metallic minerals, which employ 
about 26% of  all manufacturing workers, SMP effects can be expected in some sub-sectors, namely 
in the sectors beverages, pharmaceutical products and non metallic minerals. As can be seen from 
the table, these effects do, however, generally not show up at the 2 digit level26. 
Industries  producing  consumer  goods,  especially  textiles,  but  also  other  consumer  goods  !ike 
jewellery  or toys,  which  are  summarised  in  the  table  under  the  heading  other  manufacturing 
industries and most fabricated metal industries (investment goods sectors) have been identified as 
industries exhibiting non-tariff barriers before 1986. Together these sectors comprise about 55% o~· 
total manufacturing employment. A decline in mark-ups in the textile sector cannot be observed, 
price-cost  margins  even  increased  in Italy  and  Sweden.  The  sector  fabricated  metai  products, 
(including machinery and equipment) includes the bulk of public procurement sectors, industries 
operating  in  regulated  markets  with  high  non-tariff  barriers  and/or  sectors  with  technicai, 
administrative and fiscal barriers. Especially in this sector one should therefore expect a decline in 
price-cost margins. In fact, as can be seen from the table, in three large EU countries (nc data are 
available for the UK) a significant decline of mark-ups can actually be observed in recent years. 
Price-cost margins did not go down in Belgium and Sweden (no data are available for Denmark). 
Notice,  however, that the  smaller countries  already  had relatively  low mark-ups.  For the sector 
other manufacturing  industries,  a  decline  in mark-ups  can be  observed  for  Germany,  Italy  and 
Belgium, while mark-ups in the UK increased, although starting from a lower level. 
26  There is  no decline in  price-cost margins for  beverages.  For pharmaceuticals we observe a  significant decline of 
price-cost margins in  Belgium (-4.2 percentage points from  1988-95) and France (-2.5  from  1988-95). Mark-ups in 
the sector industrial chemicals declined as well in some countries, na.mely by -2.25 percentage points in  France, by -
2.9 percentage points in the UK and by -0.3 percentage points in Belgium over the same time period. 
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) Table 8.1:  Mark-up Estirmtes (1970-95) 
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